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Governmental Conservation Easements 
A MEANS TO ADVANCE EFFICIENCY, FREEDOM 
FROM COERCION, FLEXIBILITY, AND DEMOCRACY∗ 
Gerald Korngold† 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty-five years, conservation easements 
have become widely recognized and utilized as a major vehicle for 
preserving natural and ecologically sensitive land. Much of the 
discussion and acquisition efforts during this time have focused 
on conservation easements held by nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs).1 Conservation easements held by NPOs have been 
lauded for being perpetual, private rather than governmental, 
efficient, consensual and representing the free choice of the 
parties, and serving the public interest in conservation.2 
During this same period, courts have increasingly 
recognized and protected property rights in the face of a variety 
of governmental actions, prompting renewed calls for diminished 
governmental control over land.3 These voices have condemned 
governmental coercion of owners and extolled the benefits of 
consensual, market-based arrangements. In light of these 
developments, the public’s ability to control land use and 
  
 ∗ © 2013 Gerald Korngold. All rights reserved. 
 † Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Fellow, Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy. Email: gkorngold@nyls.edu. 
 1 Conservation easements held by NPOs are also referred to as “private” 
conservation easements. This paper sometimes uses the term “easements” for 
“conservation easements” for simplicity. For data on the growth of NPO easements, see 
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL CENSUS REPORT: A LOOK AT VOLUNTARY LAND 
CONSERVATION IN AMERICA, available at https://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/ 
land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010-final-report.  
 2 See infra note 8.  
 3 See Ilya Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously? The Supreme Court and 
the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law 1 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 08-53, 2009), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/ 
files/publications/working_papers/08-53%20Taking%20Property%20Rights.pdf (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has expanded protection for constitutional property rights. After 
decades of neglect, the Court has begun to take constitutional property rights 
seriously.” (citation omitted)); see also infra Parts II.B, III.A.1, and III.A.2.  
468 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
activities through uncompensated regulation has been curtailed 
and critiqued.  
This paper argues that these two independent 
developments—the rise of private conservation easements and 
the critique of excessive public land use regulation—militate for 
the increased use of consensual conservation easements by 
governmental entities to achieve public land preservation goals. 
Governmental conservation easements can realize the benefits 
of efficiency, consent and free choice, and conservation, while 
also avoiding the coercion implicit in public land use regulation. 
Moreover, governmental conservation easements have 
advantages over private easements in some situations: they may 
be more easily modified or terminated to address future changes 
in conservation values and community needs; they are 
transparent and subject to democratic, participatory processes; 
and they may be better positioned to discern and represent the 
public interest when making acquisition, modification, and 
termination decisions about conservation easements.  
I make two clarifications up front. First, I do not argue 
that NPO-held conservation easements should be eschewed. 
Indeed, private conservation easements provide tremendous 
benefits, and they should continue to be utilized and lauded as a 
land preservation vehicle. My main contribution lies in 
demonstrating that governmental conservation easements 
should also be increased, and that there may be some lessons 
from governmental conservation easements that can be 
beneficially applied to NPO-based easements. Second, I believe 
that public land use regulation is important and that the 
government should continue to use it. I simply suggest, however, 
that, in some circumstances, the increased use of consensual 
land use arrangements can advance land preservation goals 
while avoiding some of the negatives of public regulation.  
Part I will examine the general background on 
conservation easements as well as the particular attributes and 
data related to governmental easements. Part II will develop the 
policy benefits and drawbacks of governmental conservation 
easements, and it will compare governmental easements to 
NPO-held easements and public land use controls. With respect 
to governmental easements, it will examine the issues of 
efficiency and cost, the dichotomy between freedom and 
coercion, the importance of flexibility, and the value of 
participatory democracy. Part III will examine some special 
concerns of governmental easements and suggest ways to 
address them, including nonconsensual acquisition through 
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eminent domain and exactions; procedural impediments to 
flexibility and democratic governance; and statutory controls 
on modification and termination. 
I. THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT ARCHITECTURE 
A. Features 
A conservation easement is a negative restriction on a 
parcel of land that prevents the owner and successors from 
altering the property’s ecological, natural, open, or scenic 
features.4 Typical conservation easement documents require a 
general undertaking not to interfere with these natural 
  
 4 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981). William 
H. Whyte, Jr. popularized if not coined the phrase, and was an early proponent. See 
generally William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America: 
Conservation Easements, URB. LAND INST.: TECHNICAL BULL., No. 36, Dec. 1959. 
Russell Brenneman was an early, influential legal writer and supporter of conservation 
easements. See generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND (1967). For prior work on the conservation easements, 
see generally Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis 
in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984) 
[hereinafter Korngold, Conservation Servitudes]; Gerald Korngold, Resolving the 
Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal 
Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1525-27 (2007); Gerald 
Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting 
Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
1039 [hereinafter Korngold, Contentious Issues]; Gerald Korngold, Globalizing 
Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International Environmental 
Protection, 28 WISC. INT’L L.J. 585 (2011) [hereinafter Korngold, Globalizing Easements].  
  Other articles on conservation easements include James Boyd, Kathryn 
Caballero & David R. Simpson, The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation: 
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2000); 
Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and 
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010); Federico 
Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation 
Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077 (1996); 
Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions, 
Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1 (2012); Jessica O. Lippman, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 
84 NEB. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Julia D. Mahoney, Land Preservation and Institutional 
Design, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 433 (2008); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the 
Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005) 
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Rethinking]; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation 
Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1897 (2008); Peter M. Morisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: 
Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); James 
L. Olmstead, Representing Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem of Now, 23 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 451 (2008); Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private 
Conservation Easements over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2010); Melissa K. 
Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and 
Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools: 
Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 373 (2001).  
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features, as well as specific, related prohibitions that may, for 
example, ban or otherwise limit subdividing the property, 
erecting additional buildings and structures, harvesting timber, 
and paving roads.5 With the exception of easements creating 
recreational rights, easements generally do not grant public 
access.6 Accordingly, conservation easements protecting natural 
habitats or views do not grant public access to the property.7  
Conservation easements are valued for safeguarding 
pleasing views, preserving biodiversity, remediating atmospheric 
conditions, protecting watersheds, and promoting psychic 
benefits.8 Proponents claim various economic advantages as well, 
ranging from preserving ecological capital for future generations 
and conserving farmland for food sources to enhancing quality of 
life in order to attract skilled labor.9 Individual property values 
may also benefit from nearby land restricted by conservation 
easements.10 Yet despite these positive features, the conservation 
easement phenomenon is more than the sum of its beneficial 
components: it is part of a new American outlook toward our land. 
Indeed, in recent years, many have come to view the conservation 
of our natural and historic heritage as a vital value to be balanced 
against the traditional model favoring full development.11 
In light of questions concerning the validity of 
conservation easements, various state legislatures have passed 
  
 5 Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1045-46. 
 6 Id. at 1046. The easement holder usually has a limited right of access to 
inspect and monitor the easement area. See id. at 1046 n.17. 
 7 Id. at 1045. 
 8 See VIRGINIA MCCONNELL & MARGARET WALLS, THE VALUE OF OPEN 
SPACE: EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES OF NONMARKET BENEFITS (2005), available at 
http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-report-open%20spaces.pdf; cf. LILLY SHOUP & REID 
EWING, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE, RECREATION FACILITIES AND 
WALKABLE COMMUNITY DESIGN (2010), available at http://www.activelivingresearch.org/ 
files/Synthesis_Shoup-Ewing_March2010_0.pdf (Open spaces generate economic 
benefits to local governments, homeowners, and businesses because of higher property 
values and tax valuations.). 
 9 See ECON. LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILA. ET AL., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF 
PROTECTED OPEN SPACE IN SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://economyleague.org/files/Protected_Open_Space_SEPA_2-11.pdf; RAND WENTWORTH, 
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE FACT SHEET: ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE PROTECTION 
(Spring 2003), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/documents/ 
economic-benefits.pdf; John L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A 
Review of the Empirical Evidence, 33 J. OF LEISURE RES. 1, 5 (2001).  
 10 See Jacqueline Geoghegan, The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land 
Use, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 91 (2002). 
 11 See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law and Society: The 
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 91-94 
(2001); D.T. Kuzmiak, The American Environmental Movement, 157 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 
265, 265-67 (1991).  
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statutes authorizing these interests.12 While some jurisdictional 
variation exists, conservation easements generally share similar 
attributes: only a qualified nonprofit organization or government 
may hold them;13 they are typically held in gross, meaning that 
the easement holder does not own adjacent land that the 
restriction benefits;14 they are usually perpetual15 and require 
unlimited duration for deductibility of easement donations;16 
they are enforceable in rem, as property interests;17 and they 
are binding on successive owners of the burdened property.18  
B. The Tax Subsidy 
While the government’s purchase of a conservation 
easement involves a direct payout of public funds, the donation 
of a conservation easement results in a tax expenditure and thus 
taps into the United States public purse as well. Under Section 
170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, a donation of a 
conservation easement to a nonprofit organization or to the 
United States, the states, or a political subdivision is deductible.19 
Moreover, for federal estate tax purposes, property values are 
reduced by the value of a conservation easement, which 
generates further potential revenue losses for the Treasury.20 
Conservation easement donations also reduce state and 
local tax revenues. Some states allow income-tax deductions or 
credits for the donations.21 Moreover, because easement 
restrictions reduce the assessed value of the land, the presence 
of conservation easements diminishes property tax revenues.22 
  
 12 See Korngold, Globalizing Easements, supra note 4, at 594-97.  
 13 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 70 (1981).  
 14 Id. § 4(1). 
 15 Id. § 2(c) (“[A] conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the 
instrument creating it otherwise provides.”).  
 16 I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).  
 17 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1).  
 18 Id., Comm’rs’ Prefatory Note.  
 19 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2006).  
 20 Property Subject to Restrictive Arrangements, 26 C.F.R. § 25.2703-1(a)(4) (1992).  
 21 See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 105-151.12 (West 2012). This is usually reflected not by a specific state tax code 
provision but by the state tracking the federal income tax structure and its deductions. 
See Jeffrey O. Sundberg & Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects of Conservation 
Easements 7 & nn.15-16 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP06JS1), 
available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=1128.  
 22 See Jet Black, LLC v. Routt Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 165 P.3d 744, 749-
50 (Colo. App. 2006) (referring to special statutory treatment of conservation easement 
land under agricultural use); Firethorn Investment v. Lancaster Cnty. Bd. of 
Equalization, 622 N.W.2d 605, 610-11 (Neb. 2001) (when land’s highest and best use 
was as a golf course, presence of conservation easements did not reduce its value); Ross 
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Lower property tax revenues leave the municipality with the 
prospect of decreasing services or increasing taxes on other 
citizens to close the gap. Accordingly, conservation easements 
both purchased by government and donated to nonprofits 
result in public expenditures, which may be direct or indirect 
costs borne by federal, state, or local governments.  
C. Governmental Conservation Easements 
A variety of governmental entities currently hold 
conservation easements of differing types. This subsection 
describes the history, forms, and emerging data on governmental 
conservation easements.  
1. Background 
Federal,23 state,24 and local25 governments currently own 
conservation easements.26 Governmental conservation easements 
  
v. Town of Santa Clara, 698 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (since land was 
already restricted against development, conservation easement did not decrease value); 
Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding trial court’s 
order to reduce property tax assessment because of conservation easement barring 
subdivision and limiting lot to agricultural uses); McKee v. Dep’t of Rev., No. TC 4620, 
2004 WL 2340265, at *3 (Or. T.C. Oct. 14, 2004) (finding significant effect of 
conservation easement on value when compared to other properties); Luca v. Lincoln 
Cnty. Assessor, No. TC-MD 010953F, 2003 WL 21252488, at *6 (Or. T.C. Mar. 19, 
2003) (court acknowledges drop in development potential); Daniel S. Stockford, 
Comment, Property Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 823 (1990) (addressing the reduced assessments resulting from the placement of a 
conservation easement). For an excellent discussion of the various jurisdictional 
treatments of conservation easements for state tax purposes, see Joan M. Youngman, 
Taxing and Untaxing Land: Open Space and Conservation Easements, 41 STATE TAX 
NOTES 747, 747-62 (2006). 
 23 See, e.g., Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 3830 (2006); United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 908-10 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(enforcing easement barring draining of wetlands enforced against successor to 
grantor); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 716 (2010) (referring to 
conservation easements held by Corps of Army Engineers). 
 24 See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 
478, 486 (Md. 2012); Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 
1991) (agricultural preservation easement); see also Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. 
Knowlton, 476 N.E.2d 988, 989 (N.Y. 1985) (conservation easements purchased by the 
Palisades Interstate Park Commission, located in New York and New Jersey).  
 25 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 623 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1981) 
(agricultural use easement held by city); Ephrata Area Sch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 
938 A.2d 264, 266, 268 (Pa. 2007) (county owned open space easement); Ashleigh G. 
Morris, Note, Conservation Easements and Urban Parks: From Private to Public Use, 
51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357 (2011) (suggesting use of municipal conservation easements 
to protect urban park lands); Amy Matzke-Fawcett, Franklin County Gets Funding 
From State to Save Farmland, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/303743 (state providing $50,000 matching 
funds to county to acquire agricultural conservation easement). 
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date back to at least the 1930s. Early federal programs include 
the National Park Service’s acquisition of scenic easements 
along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkway in the 1930s 
and 1940s;27 the legislation authorizing the acquisition of 
wetland easements and their designation as Waterfowl 
Production Areas in 1958;28 and the Highway Beautification Act 
of 1965, which provided funding to the states for the 
acquisition of scenic easements along highways.29 The state of 
Wisconsin launched “the first major state-supported program 
to purchase conservation easements in the United States” in 
the early 1950s, when it began to acquire scenic easements 
along highways adjacent to the Mississippi River.30 
Governments may acquire easements by different 
methods and for different purposes. For example, governmental 
easements may be acquired in exchange for consideration31 or 
  
 26 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.18, 8.5 (2000) 
(discussing acquisition and enforcement of conservation easements by governmental 
bodies). Government also might acquire a conservation easement and subsequently 
transfer it to a nonprofit, see, e.g., Mesa Cnty. Land Conservancy v. Allen, No. 
11CA1416, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 922 (June 7, 2012) (enforcing easement granted by 
United States through the Farmers Home Administration to a nonprofit), or provide 
funds to a nonprofit to acquire an easement, see, e.g., Rusty Dennen, Caroline Farmer 
Protects Land, Fort, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (Dec. 3, 2011), http://fredericksburg.com/ 
News/FLS/2011/122011/12032011/668261; Rusty Dennen, Easement Problem Leads to 
Lawsuit, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (May 22, 2012), http://fredericksburg.com/News/ 
FLS/2012/052012/05222012/702032/; Christopher Dunagan, Forest and Streams 
Protected in Union River Area, KITSAP SUN (Bremerton, WA) (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.forterra.org/news/forest_and_streams_protected_in_union_river_area (state 
provided $480,000 to NPO to acquire easement on forestland). The federal government 
has also contributed funds under the Army Compatible Use Buffer program for the 
acquisition of easements by state and local government and NPOs surrounding army 
bases that preserves the land and also provides buffer for training purposes. See 10 
U.S.C. § 2684a (2006). 
 27 Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers 
Should Know (And Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation 
Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,223, 10,223-24 (2004). 
 28 United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1996).  
 29 See generally Roger A. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway 
Beautification Program, 45 DENV. L.J. 168 (1968) (describing federal Highway 
Beautification Act of 1965 allocating each state federal funds to acquire easements and 
fees along highways). 
 30 Brian W. Ohm, The Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin’s Great 
River Road: A Progress Report on Perpetuity, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 177, 178 (2000). 
 31 See, e.g., Johansen, 93 F.3d at 461 (waterfowl easement purchased in 
1960s in North Dakota on 320 acres for $600); Droste v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 159 P.3d 
601, 603 (Colo. 2007) (describing purchase by County in 1999 of conservation easement 
on 500 acres for $7.5 million and 1996 purchase of easement on 100 acres for $480,000); 
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 478 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2012) (agricultural easement on 199 acres purchased for $796,500 by Maryland 
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, an entity of the Maryland Department of 
Agriculture); Bill Reed, Bucks County Preserves 150th Farm in Its Preservation 
Program, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 23, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-03-23/news/ 
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by gift.32 Moreover, governments may obtain easements 
proactively pursuant to a statutory framework, such as specific 
legislation authorizing the acquisition of easements to preserve 
agricultural lands,33 wetlands,34 or other environmentally 
sensitive lands.35 Alternatively, where the easement is not part 
of a larger pattern or program of easements, it may be acquired 
as part of the bargaining process in granting approval of a 
developer’s building plan.36  
Governmental easements vary in duration. While some 
governmental conservation easements are perpetual,37 others 
may be for a designated time period, especially where the 
government acquires them pursuant to particular programs.38 
Moreover, some easements may be drafted as perpetual but 
permitted to terminate if certain events occur.39 
  
31229859_1_agricultural-land-preservation-program-farms-4-h-program (payment of 
$608,260 by county for conservation easement on 135 acre farm).  
 32 See, e.g., Carol Kugler, State Receives 1,500-acre Land Donation, 
BLOOMINGTON, IND. HERALD-TIMES, May 13, 2012, at C7, available at 
http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/stories/2012/05/11/earth.703801.sto. 
 33 See, e.g., Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 3830 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-501 (West 2012); Twomey v. Comm’r of Food 
& Agric., 759 N.E.2d 691, 694 n.5 (Mass. 2001).  
 34 See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(waterfowl habitat easement “effectuates an important national concern”); Wetlands 
Reserve Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1467.4 (2009).  
 35 See, e.g., 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5001, 5005 (West 2012) (listing a variety of 
purposes including open space, watershed protection, scenic protection, and forestry, among 
others); United States v. Hoyte, No. C10-2044BHS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30105 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 7, 2012) (easement pursuant to the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic 
Area Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 544 (West 2012)); Lee Logan, County Mulls Buying, Preserving 
Land Near Starkey Wilderness Park, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 24, 2011), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/county-mulls-buying-preserving-land-
near-starkey-wilderness-park/1207621 (describing Pasco County, Florida’s Environmental 
Land Acquisition and Management Program that acquires conservation easements). 
 36 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974); Stonegate 
Family Holdings, Inc. v. Revolutionary Trails, Inc., 900 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010). With most private easements held by NPOs, the tax benefit provides the 
“consideration” for the transfer. Since donated easements must be perpetual in order to 
receive the tax benefit, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, easements 
contributed to NPOs are usually of unlimited duration.  
 38 See, e.g., Roath v. United States, No. 10-C-0228, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
150120 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 30, 2011) (thirty-year easement under the Wetlands Preserve 
Program); Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (ten-
year, renewable agricultural easement).  
 39 See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 479 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“in perpetuity, or for so long as profitable farming is feasible”).  
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2. Data 
The dearth of data on the number of easements, their 
total acreage and location, and other key issues has hindered 
the policy assessment of conservation easements. In 2011, a 
consortium of several nonprofit organizations and federal 
agencies launched the National Conservation Easement 
Database in an attempt to collect these data and fill the 
existing gap.40 While these data provide an incomplete picture 
of the current inventory of conservation easements (since 
reporting is voluntary), they still represent an important 
advance.41 As of the most recent update in September 2012, the 
database reports that there are currently 64,640 governmental 
easements, which cover 11,410,653 acres.42 To provide some 
perspective, the combined size of Rhode Island, Delaware, 
Connecticut, and Hawaii is some nine million acres.43 Table 1 
provides a breakdown of these findings:  
 
Table 1. Number and acreage of governmental conservation easements 
held by federal, state, local, and regional governmental entities44 
Evidence suggests that the public has been willing to 
support governmental acquisition of conservation easements.45 
For example, 77 percent of 1630 ballot measures to provide 
funds for land conservation between 1994 and 2005 were 
approved, providing $31.1 billion in funding.46 According to 
some reports, however, the 2008 financial crisis has had a 
  
 40 Nat’l Conservation Easement Database, CONSERVATIONREGISTRY.ORG, 
http://conservationeasement.us/about (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).  
 41 There is also only limited data on conservation easements held by NPOs. 
See Korngold, Globalizing Easements, supra note 4, at 597.  
 42 Nat’l Conservation Easement Database, supra note 40. 
 43 Youngman, supra note 22, at 747 n.1.  
 44 Data from the National Conservation Easement Database, supra note 40. 
 45 See, e.g., Seong-Hoon Cho et al., Measuring Rural Homeowners’ Willingness 
to Pay for Land Conservation Easements, 7 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 757, 768 (2005).  
 46 Andrew J. Plantinga, The Economics of Conservation Easements, in LAND 
POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES 90, 91-92 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2007).  
476 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2 
negative impact on public funding of open space.47 
Nevertheless, governmental conservation easements are a 
growing phenomenon. Increased data collection of existing 
easements will assist policy makers in framing conservation 
easement decisions going forward.  
II. OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY GOVERNMENTAL 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
Governmental acquisition and administration of 
conservation easements offers various benefits. This section will 
assess the advantages and disadvantages of the government’s 
use of conservation easements to preserve land, as compared 
with zoning and other forms of public regulation, as well as 
conservation easements held by NPOs. This section will focus on 
four policies: efficiency, freedom versus coercion, flexibility, and 
local democratic control. For the purposes of this section, we will 
assume that the sale or donation of a conservation easement by 
the owner to the government is consensual—that is, a freely 
negotiated market transaction. Part III will examine the issues 
inherent in governmental acquisition of conservation easements 
by exaction and eminent domain.  
A. Efficiency and Cost 
1. Benefits 
Consensual conservation easement transactions—
whether engaged in by government or NPOs—can increase the 
efficient allocation of our limited (and nonrenewable) land 
resources. In a market exchange, the purchaser of a 
conservation easement can acquire the precise interest in 
property that it desires (for example, scenic protection without 
physical access) and the seller can retain the degree of property 
rights that it wishes (for example, the right to maintain a 
single home on the property) while also monetizing the value of 
any property interest it is willing to sell (that is, the easement). 
If the parties were unable to negotiate conservation easements, 
the party seeking to conserve the scenic view would be required 
to overinvest in a fee interest, and the landowner would be 
forced to liquidate more property rights than it desired—
  
 47 See Joseph De Avila, Crunch Hits Open-Space Funds, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703748904575411690085797942.html. 
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namely, the possessory right.48 In consensual sales of 
conservation easements, each party can get the partial interest 
in land that it seeks, which creates efficiency gains.49  
Courts have implicitly recognized the importance of 
enforcing freely negotiated, efficiency-maximizing transactions. 
For example, one court enforced an agricultural easement 
against a successor to the burdened property: “Public funds 
were expended for the [easement] as a result of a bargain made 
by the commissioner and the Bennetts’ predecessors in title, a 
bargain of which the Bennetts had notice. There is no reason 
why this reasonable restriction should not be enforced 
according to its terms.”50 Another court, in denying a request to 
install a swimming pool on land subject to a conservation 
easement, explained:  
[A] conservation restriction yields an economic benefit to the grantor 
of the restriction and successor owners of the property. . . . In return 
for that benefit to the owner, it is reasonable that the conservation 
restriction be protected against expedient exemptions which defeat 
the purpose of preserving land in its natural state.51  
2. Comparison to Zoning 
Governments incur a direct cost when they purchase a 
conservation easement. By contrast, when governments place 
the same substantive restrictions on the land through 
regulation, they are freed from making an initial cash outlay to 
the property owner. This would appear to provide an easy 
choice for governments, especially in an era of limited budgets: 
Why pay for a restriction when they could get one for free?  
Although zoning comes without purchase costs, easement 
acquisition may still be cost effective. First, governments may 
avoid paying cash consideration when conservation easements 
are donated, and the donors will receive the benefit of 
charitable deductions.52 By utilizing donated easements, state 
  
 48 Additionally, if government or an NPO were forced to acquire the property 
in fee, there could be a total loss of property tax collections on the property due to 
exemptions. See generally DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, LINCOLN INST. OF 
LAND POLICY, PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES: BALANCING MUNICIPAL AND NONPROFIT 
INTERESTS (2010), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significant-
features-property-tax/upload/sources/ContentPages/documents/PILOTs%20PFR%20final.pdf.  
 49 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (6th ed. 2003).  
 50 Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Mass. 1991).  
 51 Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).  
 52 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.  
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and local governments can cover much of the acquisition cost 
through federal tax expenditures.  
Second, purchasing an easement on a single property 
may involve significantly lower transaction costs than enacting 
new zoning restrictions. If a municipality goes through the 
regulatory process of “downzoning” a single property (that is, 
increasing the restrictions on it) rather than legislating over a 
broader area, the affected owner might be successful in 
challenging the restriction.53 A broader rezoning would require 
studies as well as administrative and legislative processes, 
which can be expensive. Thus, the purchase of an easement on 
the single property ultimately may be more cost effective. As a 
related matter, speed and nimble movement may be essential 
to preserve a property that is facing development. Quick 
responses are imperative to a willing easement seller who is 
fielding other offers. An easement purchase can be executed 
more quickly and cost-effectively than a proper rezoning. 
Third, as will be discussed in Part II.B.2 below, the 
courts have applied regulatory takings jurisprudence to limit 
the restrictions that can be imposed on development through 
open-space zoning. But even if the governmental action were 
vindicated by the court, litigation is expensive. If government 
were to lose, it may also be required to pay significant 
compensation to the owner. Thus, regulation’s short-term cost 
savings ultimately may yield long-term losses.  
3. NPO Holders 
An NPO’s acquisition of a conservation easement has 
certain advantages. Given the large demands on government 
and the reality of limited resources, land conservation is better 
served when private citizens step up to help improve their 
communities. In particular, NPO purchases of easements do 
not require direct public expenditures, which would otherwise 
draw from the limited governmental resources. Also, when an 
NPO purchases an easement, stewardship (that is, monitoring 
and enforcing the easement) becomes the responsibility of the 
private organization.54 NPOs may be more nimble than 
  
 53 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.37 (5th ed. 2003).  
 54 Costs of enforcement have led to the creation of an insurance program for 
litigation expenses. Felicity Barringer, Insurance Firm Is Set Up for Land Trusts, 
Which See Legal Costs Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/science/earth/insurance-company-approved-for-
land-trusts.html. 
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government actors, allowing them to react quickly and preserve 
threatened land. Nevertheless, NPO easements raise a number 
of potential concerns that governmental ownership can 
mitigate or avoid.  
First, in the course of acquiring conservation easements, 
NPOs have virtually unlimited discretion, and they are not 
required to follow a plan or set of standards.55 A nonprofit may 
simply accept any easement offered, even though the land and 
easement terms provide dubious environmental benefits. Many 
nonprofits abide by rigorous standards in acquiring easements 
and provide great value to the public.56 Nevertheless, the best 
practices of industry leaders are not binding on other 
nonprofits, so the possibility that the public will subsidize the 
acquisition of low-value conservation easements through tax 
expenditures always remains a risk.57  
Second, private organizations do not acquire easements 
pursuant to a public land use plan. This can lead to a 
patchwork of easements that fail to yield a community-wide 
open-space and preservation plan.58 As a result, conservation 
easements might be sited based on the random decisions of 
private donors and unaccountable NPOs, who are properly 
pursuing their own interests and missions but not necessarily 
the broader and inclusive land use goals that the wider public 
would seek.59 This is inconsistent with current notions of 
  
 55 The Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 70 (1981), only 
defines the values inherent in a conservation easement but does not provide a standard 
for how conservation easements must be created. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006), sets a floor on 
deductibility but does not necessarily reflect an optimal easement.  
 56 The Nature Conservancy, for example, is a recognized leader in high-
quality easement practices. See About Us: Vision and Mission, NATURE 
CONSERVATORY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/index.htm (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2012).  
 57 See ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH: 
CONSERVATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 44-45 (2004) (emphasizing 
the importance of professional design standards). The Land Trust Association has been 
engaged in a project to accredit land trusts that follow best practices. Accreditation, 
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2012). While this may provide some help on easement acquisition, this 
is a non-mandatory program.  
 58 See Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the 
Number of Land Trusts Make Economic Sense?, 79 LAND ECON. 311, 312 (2003) 
(“[L]ocal land trusts specializing in providing open space often do not consider the 
impact of their decisions on regional conservation benefits. . . . [L]ack of coordination 
among [land trusts] has become . . . a serious problem . . . .”).  
 59 Again, industry leaders like The Nature Conservancy, however, typically 
coordinate their easement acquisitions with governmental plans and agencies. Partners 
in Conservation, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/our-partners/ 
index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).  
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planning, which support broader regional and interstate land 
use planning.60  
Finally, even proponents of NPO-held conservation 
easements have warned of the potential class issues with such 
easements. A pattern of easements can have the effect of large-lot 
zoning, by preserving landed estates and residential areas, and 
by preventing subdivision and construction of more affordable 
homes.61 William H. Whyte, perhaps the earliest booster of NPO 
conservation easements, posed concerns of inherent “muted class 
and economic conflicts,” with easement donors being the “gentry” 
who have an interest in the natural countryside, not in open 
space with access for parks and playgrounds.62 
In contrast, governmental acquisition of conservation 
easements can and should be done pursuant to a coordinated, 
public land use plan or specific acquisition program. The 
democratic, administrative, and legal constraints on public 
action may help to ensure that the government’s public 
expenditures yield high-quality easements that deliver a bigger 
bang for the conservation buck. Additionally, transparency is 
improved because citizens can require government to disclose 
easement data, while NPOs are under no such obligation.63 The 
electoral process and public discussion can help to achieve an 
even distribution of government’s conservation benefits and 
mitigate potential elitist actions.64 
4. The Risk of Rent Seeking 
Because the government’s acquisition of a conservation 
easement utilizes public funds, easement purchases should 
serve the needs of the community. A particular easement may 
benefit neighboring owners more than other citizens, but the 
overall acquisition pattern should serve the overall citizenry. 
Unfortunately, there is a temptation for rent seeking, whereby 
powerful individuals lobby government officials to purchase 
  
 60 See ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 26-30, 
132-34 (1994). 
 61 There is at times a tension between proponents of conservation and affordable 
housing. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, In Tony Monterey County, Slums and a Land War, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115655289960046223.html. 
 62 Whyte, supra note 4, at 36-37.  
 63 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1046-47, 1070. 
 64 See Gregg MacDonald, Salona Task Force Will Meet, WASH. POST, June 9, 
2011, at 16 (describing public process to determine appropriate uses of land under 
conservation easements acquired by government, specifically whether ballfields should 
be permitted or land should be retained in more natural state).  
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conservation easements that will enhance the value of these 
individuals’ properties.65 Both rent seekers and officials may 
view the public purse as “other people’s money,” to be spent to 
enhance the value of rent seekers’ property and help the 
politicians curry favor. Because land costs will be distorted by 
acquisitions where the buyer does not internalize the costs, 
such rent-seeking purchases will not yield efficient land 
allocations within the community. Moreover, there is the 
obvious unfairness when some citizens subsidize the wealth 
accumulation of others. NPOs are not susceptible to this 
maneuver, however, because they do not have ready access to a 
pool of funds and are required to both raise their funds and buy 
land in a competitive market.  
Even if there were no rent seeking in the easement 
acquisition, neighbors whose property values are benefited by 
the governmental easement may view the easement as an 
entitlement.66 This will cause them to seek its enforcement and 
resist any compromise. While this reaction is understandable, 
these neighbors ignore the fact that the easement was 
purchased to provide a public good, not a private benefit for 
their properties. This phenomenon may arise with NPO-held 
easements as well, where neighbors believe they hold an 
interest in the burdened land.  
The risk of government manipulation, both by rent 
seekers and officials seeking reelection, is a concern inherent in 
many governmental activities, including the acquisition of 
property and services. For some, this means that the leviathan’s 
activities should be limited. For others, the government’s 
promotion of the public welfare through concerted action is 
important and valuable, and such activity should continue with 
appropriate risk-mitigation techniques—for example, procedural 
guidelines, sunshine regulation, anti-corruption measures, and 
other steps.  
Governmental conservation easements are an efficient, 
cost-effective vehicle for preserving land. While they require 
up-front costs, they may prove cheaper over the long run than 
  
 65 There is a parallel problem when easements are not purchased as part of a 
governmental conservation program, but rather are exacted as part of the subdivision 
approval process. See infra Part III.A.2. There is a temptation that neighbors may 
lobby officials for the exaction to enhance their properties and officials might easily 
agree to placate voters.  
 66 See discussion of Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009), infra Part III.B.1.b.  
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public land use regulation because they avoid potential 
litigation expenses and awards.  
B. Coercion and Freedom 
1. Policy Considerations 
Governmental acquisition of a conservation easement 
through a consensual market transaction represents the 
property owner’s free choice to relinquish rights in the land. 
Ownership entitles a land holder to exercise free choice in 
order to maximize personal utility and happiness with respect 
to the property, whatever others may think of that decision.67 
Thus, if an owner were to grant—or not grant—a conservation 
easement, the law should respect and enforce that preference.68 
Even supporters of preservation may balk at “legislated 
conservation easements” for impinging on their land values 
and freedom.69 
Unlike consensual conservation easements, public land 
use regulation places restrictions on owners without their 
direct consent. In recent years, there have been renewed 
objections to the coercive nature of land use regulation and its 
effect on the rights of property owners.70 For example, William 
  
 67 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (2d ed. 1998) (arguing that property 
rights allow for democratic, participatory government as citizen-owners can criticize 
officials without fearing the loss of property privileges).  
 68 See Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1968) (“Where a man’s land is 
concerned, he may impose . . . any restrictions he pleases.”); Richard Epstein, Notice 
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982). 
Courts have recognized that freely negotiated conservation easements acquired by 
government should be enforced against the owners. United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 
906, 910 (8th Cir. 1974) (enforcing easement barring draining of wetlands enforced 
against successor to grantor; “[The Government] acquired an interest which it termed 
an easement. It is clear that the parties intended it to be a permanent interest.”); Md. 
Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 985 A.2d 565, 578 (Md. 2009) (“We do not see any 
ambiguity in the instrument, and construe it according to its plain language.”). 
 69 See Matt Smith, An Unlikely Group Rebels Against Preservation Districts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/us/ 
an-unlikely-group-rebels-against-preservation-districts.html (one owner stating that 
“when regulations make it prohibitive economically to make improvements on your 
property, it’s over the top for me”).  
 70 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN x (1985) (“I argue that the eminent domain clause and parallel 
clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the 
heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control, 
workers’ compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive taxation.”); Gregory M. 
Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After 
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REV. 891, 891 (2002) (“Between 1987 and 
2000 the Supreme Court decided a large number of takings cases, and landowners won 
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A. Fischel has argued that the absence of a compensation 
requirement for the small number of community owners who 
bear the brunt of a zoning ordinance promotes inefficiency.71 To 
demonstrate this phenomenon, he provides the illustration of a 
town that wants to impose open-space zoning (that is, require 
minimum lot sizes of ten acres), thus barring farmers from 
subdividing and cashing in, while preserving the agrarian 
amenity for the rest of the population. Because the majority is 
not required to compensate those who are burdened by the 
regulation, it is free to ignore the plan’s effect on the town’s 
total land values. In contrast, a compensation requirement 
would keep government from “overconsuming” land. Moreover, 
as the zoning beneficiaries, through increased property values, 
because the majority owners benefit from the zoning through 
increased property values, they should pay compensation in the 
form of higher property taxes. Therefore, the absence of a 
compensation requirement leads to rent seeking by the majority, 
which is especially problematic in this example because affected 
owners cannot easily exit the regulatory scheme by selling their 
properties. Nevertheless, Fischel perceives a judicial reluctance 
to require compensation, perhaps due to the political power of 
wealthy landowners in the zoning majority or a fear of a broader 
assault on all municipal regulation.  
Government therefore may prefer using noncoercive 
land conservation methods, such as negotiated conservation 
easements. Indeed, in light of the high costs involved in 
defending regulation against legal action, conservation 
easements may provide a lower cost alternative. Additionally, a 
prolonged battle over land use regulation can be divisive 
among the citizenry and ultimately corrosive to the fabric of 
the community.72  
  
most of them. With this gradual drift toward the landowners’ position and with no 
recent changes in Court membership, Court-watchers had little reason to expect the 
beginning of the 21st century to produce any striking change in the direction of the 
Court’s takings decisions. The Court’s first two rulings of the new century, however, 
have largely disappointed property-rights advocates while heartening those who favor 
the rights of government entities to regulate land.”). 
 71 See William A. Fischel, Public Goods and Property Rights: Of Coase, 
Tiebout, and Just Compensation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND 
LAW 343-63 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).  
 72 See Gerald Korngold, Cutting Municipal Services During Fiscal Crisis: 
Lessons from the Denial of Services to Condominium and Homeowners Association 
Owners, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 131-34 (2012).  
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2. Legal Challenges 
Legislation that imposes the substantive terms of a 
conservation easement, including a ban on the erection of 
buildings, might be challenged as a regulatory taking.73 
Depending on the particular facts, a burdened owner might 
show that the economic impact of the regulation is so great, 
and the retained rights of the owner so few, that the legislation 
crosses the line between a permissible police power regulation 
and a compensable taking.74 The results in a given case would 
depend on the scope and extent of the conservation regulation 
and the rights the landowner retained. Rigorous legislation 
banning all structures, development, timbering, agricultural 
activity, and other uses75 might be viewed as destructive to all 
economic use of the property and thus a per se taking under 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,76 while a height 
regulation preserving scenic views would likely be upheld.77  
The Supreme Court has been satisfied whenever some 
economic value remains, even though there has been a 
significant diminution due to the land use regulation. Thus, 
“open-space zoning,” which restricts the use of land to open 
space and single-family residences, did not amount to a taking 
in Agins v. City of Tiburon because the ordinance permitted 
owners to build one to five homes, even though they could not 
build the higher-density project they had hoped for.78 Similarly, 
the coastal regulation in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which 
restricted the owner of eighteen acres to a $200,000 residence on 
the parcel, did not constitute a taking.79 The specific prohibitions 
of “conservation-easement-type” public regulation will determine 
whether there has been a taking. Permitting the fee owner to 
  
 73 See generally Douglas R. Appler, America’s Converging Open Space 
Protection Policies: Evidence from New Hampshire, Virginia, and Oregon, 36 URB. LAW. 
341 (2004); Janice C. Griffith, Green Infrastructure: The Imperative of Open Space 
Preservation, 42/43 URB. LAW. 259 (2010/2011).  
 74 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“the 
economic impact of the regulation”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 75 Conservation easements often provide for extensive regulation of activities 
and uses, although (unlike in the posited regulation) they usually permit the owner to 
maintain a residence—which would likely be enough to counter a claim of a regulatory 
taking. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1045-46.  
 76 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See Friedenburg v. N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (wetlands 
regulation leaving owner only five percent of the value of the land was held a taking).  
 77 See Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 
173-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding tree-trimming regulation to protect views). 
 78 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).  
 79 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).  
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maintain a home on the property might be viewed as allowing 
adequate economic use to defeat a regulatory taking claim.  
Legislation that enacts the provisions of a conservation 
easement could also be analogized to a growth-management 
program that permanently bars development. Under Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,80 such a program would be vulnerable to a takings 
challenge. Tahoe refused to hold that a temporary moratorium 
was a per se taking, but the Court indicated that a moratorium 
of an excessive duration might be unconstitutional as applied 
to a particular landowner. Moratoria over a year could be 
treated with “special skepticism.” Accordingly, it would appear 
that a “permanent moratorium” would not be upheld under the 
Tahoe analysis.81 There are thus substantial policy, practical, 
and legal arguments against imposing the more stringent 
aspects of conservation easements through public regulation, 
rather than through agreement with consenting owners. 
Municipalities could be required not only to pay litigation 
expenses and damage awards but also to needlessly exhaust 
reputation and civic capital through overextensive regulation.  
C. Flexibility 
The perpetual duration of most conservation easements 
preserves land forever and supports environmental goals. Under 
a conservation easement, the easement holder has a permanent, 
enforceable property interest in the burdened land. By contrast, 
zoning and other public land use regulation can be amended. 
Moreover, government officials who make rezoning decisions are 
often heavily influenced by short-term needs and special-interest 
lobbying, such as the desire to raise additional revenue through 
development and the specter of looming elections.82 Conservation 
easements therefore have the advantage of perpetual 
preservation, which frees them from the usual legislative 
vagaries implicit in legislative conservation efforts.  
The permanent aspect of conservation easements, 
however, may present inflexible barriers to land use changes 
that are necessary to satisfy society’s evolving needs. In rare 
cases, circumstances may change in such a way that it becomes 
  
 80 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  
 81 See generally Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
 82 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1055.  
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necessary to modify or perhaps terminate a conservation 
easement in order to maximize social welfare for current and 
future generations.83 Evolving climate and environmental 
conditions coupled with scientific advances may alter our view 
of what is valuable to preserve, making it sensible to shift 
development to land that is subject to an easement but is no 
longer ecologically important.84 Moreover, in some cases, social, 
economic, technological, and human developments may require 
that a conserved parcel be used to serve other needs. Given a 
paucity of alternative viable sites, there may come a point, for 
example, when land burdened by an easement will be better 
suited for development in order to allow for some other 
pressing social need, such as to provide employment in an 
economically depressed area or to construct affordable housing 
in a previously exclusionary community. Competing visions of 
environmental necessity may clash as well. For example, land 
under an easement may be the optimal site for a solar-panel 
field or wind turbines, even though such structures and surface 
disturbances would violate the easement’s terms.85 
As a result, some situations may arise where it will be 
necessary to modify or even terminate a conservation 
easement.86 When the parties cannot agree to a modification or 
termination, judicial action may be necessary under real-
covenant doctrines such as changed conditions, relative 
  
 83 Specious attempts to invoke public policy should be rejected by the courts. 
See Gresczyk v. Landis, No. HHDCV044004887, 2006 WL 1644545, at *7 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. May 25, 2006) (“The plaintiff’s complaint seeks to enforce a deed restriction on the 
defendant’s property under the farmland preservation program. The defendant’s claim 
that golf courses are environmentally friendly, if true, is legally and factually 
uncoupled from the issue of whether the development of [the property] as a golf 
course . . . is prohibited on this property as a matter of law by the terms of the deed to 
the state and the provisions of the [farmland preservation easement statute].”).  
 84 See Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2008, at F1 (quoting Healy Hamilton, director of the Center for Biodiversity Research 
and Information at the California Academy of Sciences: “We have over a 100-year 
investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that may no longer protect the 
target ecosystems for which they were formed . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 85 See Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, 
at B1 (A report concerning a solar panel field challenge by environmentalists was 
unclear as to whether the conservation interest was a fee or easement, but the conflict 
would be the same in either situation); Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town 
Ownership of Lots, RIVER VALLEY SUN J. (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.sunjournal.com/node/636647 (reporting on town meeting to discuss 
rescinding town’s conservation easement so that six wind towers could be built). 
 86 Some commentators are deeply troubled by modification and termination, and 
suggest strong procedural and substantive safeguards to perpetuity. See discussion in 
connection with cy pres, infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. While I believe that 
modification and especially termination should be rather uncommon occurrences, they are 
inevitable as the law needs to accommodate changes and the needs of future generations.  
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hardship, and the prohibition of covenants violating public 
policy.87 It would be better, however, if the parties to the 
easement could agree to alter the easement, since this would 
save time and litigation costs. Moreover, because the parties 
have “bought in” to the change, this would likely yield a more 
lasting and effective arrangement. It is therefore important that 
the legal rules and norms governing the easement holder allow 
necessary, consensual alterations of conservation easements. 
This is essential with both governmental and NPO easements. 
The next section will examine the relative capabilities of 
government and nonprofit holders to alter easements by consent.  
D. Local, Democratic Governance 
As described above,88 nonprofit organizations are not 
bound by public land use plans in acquiring conservation 
easements, and some might accept easements that do not 
result in a meaningful conservation easement plan. As also 
described above, governmental conservation easements that 
are subject to a plan may be more effective vehicles.  
Similarly, with respect to modification and termination, 
the presence of public input, process, and control in the 
governmental easement context might also bring superior 
results when compared to NPO easements. An NPO easement 
holder would decide this important matter of local land use 
solely by reference to its conservation mission, free from public 
scrutiny and accountability.89 Moreover, because an easement 
  
 87 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1076-81. In 
Northampton Twp. v. Parsons, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 607, rev’d, 2011 Pa. 
Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 549, the court applied the doctrine of relative hardship and 
refused to order the fee owner to remove a barn built in violation of a governmentally-
held conservation easement. The fee owner had permitted the public to use the 
basketball courts housed in the barn. The court explained:  
Under this very unique set of facts, the harm that [the Parsons] and the 
community would suffer by having to remove this structure is far greater 
than the harm [the Township] will suffer if the pole barn remains on the 
property. If the pole barn is removed, [the Parsons] will suffer financially in 
the both the costs of constructing the barn as well as the cost of removing it, 
and the community will suffer the loss of this valuable resource. . . . [The 
Parsons] have been ordered to dedicate an equal amount of land in open 
space, and therefore [the Township] will not suffer the loss of dedicated land. 
Id. at 16-17. 
 88 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
 89 Stressing their desire to maintain state and local, rather than federal, 
control over Alaskan land issues, state legislators in Alaska introduced a resolution 
urging the federal government to assume control of New York City’s Central Park. 
Andy Newman, From Alaska, Great Concern for Central Park, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 
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can be held in gross, the nonprofit may be located some 
distance away, enabling an absent entity to singlehandedly 
decide a key local concern, without understanding local issues 
and priorities. By contrast, a government easement holder 
faced with an alteration proposal would be bound to achieve 
the broader public interest and would not be restricted by a 
conservation mission.90 Its decision would be made in public 
view, likely through open hearings, with due consideration of 
local issues and values by officials accountable to voters for 
their decisions.91 Thus, this essential land use decision would 
remain in the hands of a participatory, democratic process. As 
in easement acquisition, there are always concerns of rent 
seeking in modification requests,92 but one can hope that the 
democratic process will serve as a check. 
Governmentally held conservation easements are 
therefore valuable vehicles for land preservation. As compared 
to NPO-held easements and public land use regulation, they 
have certain benefits and disadvantages in terms of achieving 
efficiency, avoiding coercion, providing flexibility, and enabling 
local democratic governance. The following section examines a 
number of problem areas that can arise with governmental 
conservation easements, and it suggests how they can be 
mitigated and even avoided.  
III. MAXIMIZING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENTAL 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
This section examines potential issues related to 
government-held conservation easements that must be skillfully 
addressed in order to maximize the efficiency, noncoercion, 
flexibility, and governance benefits of governmental easements. 
These issues include nonconsensual acquisition through eminent 
domain and exactions, procedural impediments to governmental 
administration of easements, and statutory controls on 
modification and termination of conservation easements.  
  
2012, 6:58 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/from-afar-great-concern-
for-central-park/. Presumably this was to make a point rather than a serious proposal, 
but it speaks of a concern about distant control of local lands.  
 90 See Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir. 
1985) (describing the process in enforcing a particular conservation easement).  
 91 There are gaps in the protection of the electoral process—those who live 
nearby and might want to move into the municipality have no vote. Neither do the 
unborn future generations who must clean up any mess left by today’s citizens.  
 92 See supra Part II.A.4.  
2013] GOVERNMENTAL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 489 
 
A. Nonconsensual Acquisition 
1. Eminent-Domain Takings of Easements 
There is a divergence among state legislation on the 
question of whether governmental entities may use eminent 
domain to create conservation easements. Moreover, even 
where this practice is authorized by statute, it is unclear 
whether courts in the current climate would sustain the use of 
eminent domain to establish conservation easements.  
There are competing policy considerations related to the 
government’s use of eminent domain to take conservation 
easements. By definition, eminent-domain takings are not 
consensual, and as a result, they may not be able to achieve the 
efficiency benefits of a negotiated easement sale.93 Eminent 
domain is necessary, however, to overcome holdouts that would 
otherwise frustrate rational government infrastructure and 
services—for example, government infrastructure in the form 
of roads, which generally must run in organized patterns and 
cannot endlessly jog around parcels. Similarly, eminent domain 
may be necessary and justifiable to acquire parcels with high 
conservation values, such as open land in otherwise developed 
areas, properties with unique ecological features, or tracts 
necessary to complete a conservation program, such as a scenic 
vista or watershed.  
As a result of these competing policy views, states 
diverge as to whether conservation easements may be created 
by an eminent-domain taking.94 Some state statutes are silent 
on the matter,95 while others expressly grant governmental 
units the power to acquire conservation easements by eminent 
domain,96 and still others expressly prohibit such takings.97 The 
Third Restatement of Property contemplates the creation of 
conservation easements by eminent domain, which finds some 
  
 93 See supra Part II.A.  
 94 For an overview, see Lara Womack Daniel & James D. Timmons, 
Conservation Easements and Eminent Domain at the Intersection: How Modern Legal 
Creations Meet Constitutional Principles, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 433 (2008).  
 95 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note (1981) (leaving to 
states to determine this question).  
 96 See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1 (West 2010); 32 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 5005(c)(1), 5008 (West 1996).  
 97 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(2) (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 457A.1 
(West 2012). See generally ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506 
(Iowa 2000) (rejecting owners’ assertions that taking of land for flood control purposes 
was the taking of a conservation easement that was barred by statute).  
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support from case law.98 In one recent case, for example, a court 
upheld the state’s use of eminent domain to acquire a 
conservation easement on four acres of a church’s property, 
which was part of a plan to mitigate the destruction of one 
hundred acres of upland forest and other terrestrial habitat as 
a result of the roadway’s expansion to serve a regional airport.99  
One possible question is whether eminent-domain 
takings to create conservation easements satisfy the “public 
use” requirement.100 Governments have traditionally taken 
affirmative easements—where the government or public has 
the right to do something on the targeted land, which supports 
the proposition that the easement serves a public use.101 Thus, 
governmental acquisitions of rights of way for utilities, 
roadways, and similar easements have been routinely 
permitted as meeting the public use test.102 Airplane flights over 
property—which may constitute compensable takings103—also 
involve affirmative physical intrusions of public carriers on the 
property in a manner similar to public roadways on land. 
Indeed, courts have shown a willingness to stretch this 
physical-intrusion rationale, finding that the noise these flights 
generate can also rise to the level of a compensable taking and 
permitting airport neighbors to receive compensation even 
where they do not experience direct overflights.104 By contrast, 
conservation easements typically do not give the government 
holder or the public a general right to physical access and 
therefore might fail to satisfy the public use requirement under 
this line of cases.105  
Thus, governments must demonstrate a different, 
nonphysical “public use” in order to uphold the creation of a 
  
 98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. h (2000).  
 99 See State v. Korean Methodist Church of N.H., 949 A.2d 738 (N.H. 2008).  
 100 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires “public use” and “just 
compensation” to sustain an eminent-domain taking. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 101 See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, 
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 2.02 (2d ed. 2004).  
 102 See, e.g., Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in 
Montgomery Cnty., Md., 549 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1982) (subway tunnel easement); 
City of Huntsville v. Rowe, 889 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 2004) (sewer easement); Liberty Dev. 
Corp. v. Metro. Utils. Dist. of Omaha, 751 N.W.2d 608 (Neb. 2008) (utilities easement).  
 103 See, e.g., Griggs v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
 104 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962); Martin v. 
Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).  
 105 Some might argue that a governmental holder with a right of occasional 
physical access under the easement document has physical access. See Korngold, 
Contentious Issues, supra note 4. That argument may be received sympathetically by a 
court or seen as boot strapping.  
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conservation easement as a valid exercise of eminent domain. 
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that a 
taking pursuant to a comprehensive, legislatively approved 
economic-redevelopment plan served a public use.106 Similarly, 
proponents would argue that an eminent-domain taking, 
pursuant to a plan and supporting environmental policies, 
benefits the public in a manner that also satisfies the public 
use test. Nevertheless, in light of the strong anti-Kelo reaction 
and state-law changes that narrow the permissible criteria for 
eminent domain, governments may face additional roadblocks 
to finding a public use in conservation easement takings.107  
2. Exacted Conservation Easements 
Developers may also grant conservation easements to 
governmental entities as a condition to favorable zoning or other 
governmental approvals, or to mitigate environmental damage 
caused by development.108 These easements are not likely part of 
  
 106 See Kelo v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 107 After Kelo, over forty states enacted changes in their eminent domain rules 
in reaction to Kelo’s finding that economic development was a permissible “public use.” 
See Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State 
Responses to Kelo, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya Somin, The Limits of 
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2012 (2009). The 
Kelo decision has been highly criticized. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a 
Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 151 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An 
American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use 
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff?” 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335 (2006); 
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based 
on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006); Marc Mihaly 
& Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial 
Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 706-08 (2011). There are few scholarly 
articles supporting Kelo. One noteworthy exception supporting the decision is Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 
(2006). I too have written in support. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational 
Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for 
Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1578-81 (2007).  
 108 See, generally, e.g., Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2007) (conditioning special use permit on the 
granting of a conservation easement); St. John’s River Water Mgmt. v. Koontz, 861 So. 
2d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (challenge to exaction); Conservation Law Found., 
Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 786 A.2d 616 (Me. 2001) (approving conditioning of 
subdivision approval on the granting of conservation easement under ordinance 
requirement that a subdivision “will not have undue adverse effect on the scenic or 
natural beauty of the area”); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 2004) 
(constitutional challenge to exaction of conservation easement); see also Grosscup v. 
Pantano, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (describing negotiation between state 
Department of Environmental Protection and owner yielding agreement to create 
conservation easement as mitigation); Cal. Oak Found. v. Cnty. of Tehama, No. 
C066415, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3970 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2012) 
(conservation easement required to mitigate loss of 774 acres of blue oak woodland 
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a broader pattern of easements, but they are theoretically 
acquired in response to a perceived threat that development 
poses to a governmental regulatory or planning scheme. As with 
other exactions, there is a risk that governments will use the 
land-approval process to extort property rights from developers 
who cannot afford the time, delay, and expense to challenge the 
request in court.  
a. The Legacy of Nollan and Dolan 
The limits of governmental exactions have been shaped 
by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard.109 In order to sustain 
an exaction against an owner’s claim of an uncompensated 
governmental taking, Nollan requires that there be an 
“essential nexus” between the condition imposed on 
development—that is, the exaction—and a “legitimate 
government interest.”110 In the absence of such a requirement, 
government could use the exaction process to obtain a 
concession from the owner for “some valid governmental 
purpose, but without payment of compensation.”111 This would 
amount to “an out-and-out plan of extortion” by government.112 
Adding to the “nexus” requirement, Dolan mandates a 
“rough proportionality” between the extent of the exaction and 
the projected negative impact of the proposed development. In 
Dolan, a landowner sought a permit to double the footprint of 
her store and also pave a parking lot on a parcel she owned. The 
  
resulting from 3000 acres of home development; easement on almost twice as many 
acres as lost); Citizens for Open Gov’t v. City of Lodi, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 459 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2012) (developer’s creation of conservation easements on other property helped 
meet mitigation burden necessary for granting of conditional use permit to allow 
shopping center); Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (describing California regulatory procedure for protecting 
archaeological sites in exchange for approval of surrounding development by use of 
conservation easements); Chelsea Inv. Grp. v. Chelsea, 792 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2010) (under PUD agreement, owner conveyed conservation easement on 
approximately 30 acres); Town of Beloit v. Cnty. of Rock, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 2003) 
(town conditioned development on creation of conservation easement); John Laidler, 
Senior Housing Planned at Former N. Andover Ski Area, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 22, 2012, at 
GN3 (conservation restriction on undeveloped portion required in exchange for special 
use permit to allow building of 133-unit senior living community on former ski area); 
Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: Emerging Concerns with Enforcement, 
26 PROB. & PROP., no. 1, Jan./Feb. 2012, at 51.  
 109 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 110 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.  
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city was willing to grant the permit, provided that the owner 
would dedicate a part of the floodplain on the property as a 
greenway and also establish a fifteen-foot-wide pedestrian and 
bike path adjacent to the greenway. The total dedication was 
approximately 10 percent of the 1.67-acre parcel. The desired 
greenway was consistent with the city’s recently adopted master 
drainage plan, which was designed to reduce flooding in areas 
along waterways, as well as the city’s comprehensive land use 
plan, which called for bike and pedestrian paths to encourage 
alternatives to automobile transportation.  
The Dolan court indicated that the city could have 
prohibited the owner from building in the floodplain under the 
police power, but that the city had gone further by requiring 
the property to be dedicated to the city as a greenway and 
permitting the public to cross the owner’s land. With respect to 
the bicycle and pedestrian pathway, “the city [had] not met its 
burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle 
and bicycle trips generated by [the] development reasonably 
relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.”113 Thus, Dolan places a 
limit on a municipality’s ability to unfairly demand concessions 
from owners seeking to develop their land.  
b. Application to Conservation Easements 
The rule and reasoning of Dolan should apply to 
conservation easement exactions, as well. The exaction in 
Dolan through dedication by the owner is functionally 
equivalent to an owner’s grant of a conservation easement to 
the city. Both involve the transfer of property rights to the city 
that result in development restrictions.114 Indeed, courts have 
  
 113 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395. 
 114 States have limited the exaction power. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, 
§ 81R (1955) (“No rule or regulation shall require, and no planning board shall impose, 
as a condition for the approval of a plan of a subdivision, that any of the land within 
said subdivision be dedicated to the public use, or conveyed or released to the 
commonwealth or to the county, city or town in which the subdivision is located, for use 
as a public way, public park or playground, or for any other public purpose, without 
just compensation to the owner thereof.”); Collings v. Planning Bd. of Stow, 947 N.E.2d 
78 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that the provision barred a town from requiring 
dedication of open space with public access as a condition of subdivision approval, even 
if the town waived certain subdivision requirements in exchange). It is unclear whether 
the exaction of a typical conservation easement that does not include public access 
would fall within the statute’s purview.  
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applied Nollan and Dolan when determining the permissibility 
of exactions requiring conservation restrictions.115  
In Smith v. Town of Mendon,116 several portions of the 
property at issue were located in environmental protection 
overlay districts (EPODs) that the town code had created. The 
code required development permits in these areas, but permits 
were granted so long as the owners could show that their 
activities would not disturb the environmental conditions.117 
The Smiths, as landowners, submitted a site plan seeking 
approval to construct a home on the non-EPOD portions of 
their land. Upon review, the town planning board found that 
this development would not result in adverse environmental 
effects, as long as the Smiths did not develop in the EPOD 
areas. Accordingly, the board conditioned final site approval on 
the requirement that the Smiths file a conservation 
restriction—in the form of a covenant running with the land—
that would prohibit development within the EPOD areas. 
Under these circumstances, however, the court held that no 
unconstitutional taking had occurred.118 
In reaching its holding, the court refused to analyze the 
town’s permit condition as an exaction under the Nollan and 
Dolan framework. Instead, the court examined whether the 
town’s action was appropriate under the regulatory takings 
tests of Palazzolo, Agins, and Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York.119 Not surprisingly, the court concluded 
that the town’s permit condition was proper under these cases’ 
more forgiving standards. In support of its determination that 
Nollan and Dolan did not apply, the Smith court first recited 
the Supreme Court’s definition of an exaction as “the 
conditioning of a land-use decision on the ‘dedication of 
  
 115 See Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 481 F. 
Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2007) (ordinance required special use permit for churches 
above certain size; county required conveyance of conservation easement over fourteen 
of the church’s 54.4 acre parcel in exchange for approval of special use application 
related to building plan; held that RLUIPA claims were ripe, but statute of limitations 
had run on inverse condemnation claim based on the granting of the conservation 
easement); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268-69 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring) (court dismissed, on ripeness grounds, 
challenge to mitigation demands of government agency requiring conservation deed 
restrictions; concurring opinion stating that “I also hope that the District will stop the 
extortionate demands on property owners which this case demonstrates.”).  
 116 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (N.Y. 2004).  
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
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property to public use.’”120 The court then concluded that 
“[t]here is no such dedication of ‘property’ here.”121 Indeed, the 
court explained that both Nollan and Dolan “involved the 
transfer of the most important ‘stick’ in the proverbial bundle 
of property rights, the right to exclude others.”122 On the other 
hand, the court argued that the Smiths’ loss could be 
distinguished since it was far less severe, finding that “[i]f it is 
a property right, . . . it is trifling compared to the rights to 
exclude or alienate.”123  
The Smith court’s analysis is unconvincing for a variety 
of reasons. First, “property” includes more than just the right 
to exclude. For example, “property” might also include the right 
to possession, which, for the Smiths, is now limited by the 
town’s perpetual ownership interest in the Smith property. 
Indeed, the town now exerts control through a regime of in rem 
rights rather than through a regulatory process that is subject 
to public, constitutional, and legislative processes and 
controls.124 Under the court’s logic, municipalities could require 
restrictive covenants that paralleled the existing zoning 
regulations from every landowner seeking a permit without 
triggering Nollan and Dolan. The court’s attitude runs counter 
to the legislature’s clear mandate which declares conservation 
easements to be property interests.125 
Second, if the restriction did not give the town an extra 
right in the Smith property, then why would the town have 
requested it? The court explained that the recorded restriction 
would provide notice to subsequent purchasers and “the most 
meaningful and responsible means of protecting the EPODs.”126 
Providing notice to purchasers, however, is not an adequate 
justification. Indeed, black-letter law provides that purchasers 
acquire property subject to zoning and land use regulations.127 
Moreover, there is no reason why EPOD legislation requires 
  
 120 Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d at 1219 (quoting City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)). 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
 123 Id.  
 124 Moreover, one case recently held that a restriction created in 1940 by an 
owner of a historic home in order to get special permit approval for subdivision was not 
subject to the state’s marketable title act that generally limits the term of restrictions 
to thirty years. Killorin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 935 N.E.2d 315, 316 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011).  
 125 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, §§ 1(1), 3, prefatory note (1981). 
 126 Id. § 3; 822 N.E.2d at 1216. 
 127 See, e.g., Rosique v. Windley Cove, Ltd., 542 So. 2d 1014, 1015-16 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1989); Josefowicz v. Porter, 108 A.2d 865, 866-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954).  
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special treatment. Accordingly, although the town might have 
preferred a recorded restriction, it cannot obtain such an 
advantage by unilaterally compelling the landowner to deed 
away their rights.  
The court underplayed the extent of the rights the town 
extracted from the Smiths, explaining that “[t]he terms of the 
proposed ‘Grant of Conservation Restriction’ mirrored the 
preexisting EPOD regulations, differing in only a few 
respects.”128 The court then acknowledged that the proposed 
grant would restrict the property in perpetuity, while the town 
could still amend the EPOD ordinance and thus create 
inconsistency between the grant and the ordinance. Although 
this may not have been important for the court, most owners 
would likely view the relinquishment of a perpetual land right 
as significant. Moreover, the court stated that the restriction 
could be enforced by injunction while ordinance violations could 
be enforced only by the issuance of citations. Again, most owners 
would likely deem these divergent legal ramifications significant. 
Accordingly, it seems clear that the grant of an in rem, perpetual, 
and enforceable property right is a significant loss.  
Notwithstanding the Smith decision, the lessons of 
Dolan apply with particular force when analyzing the validity 
of exacted conservation easements. The concern over 
“extortion” of conservation easements in exchange for permits, 
for example, apparently underlies a California statute that 
provides, “no local governmental entity may condition the 
issuance of an entitlement for use on the applicant’s granting of 
a conservation easement.”129 As one court explained: 
One purpose of [the statute] is to insure that such conveyances to 
public entities are, in fact, voluntary . . . . [It] prevents a government 
entity from requiring an involuntary conveyance of a conservation 
easement and thus, protects the landowner from an unreasonable 
taking of property rights.130 
Therefore, exactions of conservation easements pose a 
risk of violating property rights. Sound policy and the 
  
 128 Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d at 1216. 
 129 CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.3 (West 2007). The California courts, however, have 
held in various contexts that the statute did not apply to bar easement exactions. See, 
e.g., San Mateo Cnty. Coastal Landowners’ Ass’n v. County of San Mateo, 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 117, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that easements in question were not exacted 
under 815 but pursuant to other authority); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. County 
of Stanislaus, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (statute did not apply 
where owner arranged for third party to grant easements).  
 130 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480, 487.  
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Constitution demand that such exactions meet the requirements 
of Nollan and Dolan in order to avoid invalid takings of property.  
c. Going Forward  
Despite the issues highlighted above, exacted 
conservation easements offer a legitimate way to force 
developers to internalize their projects’ environmental costs. 
Accordingly, these easements may embody sound policy, and 
they will typically pass constitutional muster—provided that the 
government ensures the nexus and proportionality requirements 
are met. If the exaction cannot satisfy these requirements, 
however, it will start to resemble simple extortion and power 
politics, permitting neighbors to extract rents through public 
officials who are anxious to placate them. Of course, this would 
run counter to the noncoercive benefits that consensual 
conservation easements can provide. Moreover, if neighbors 
and municipal officials are extracting gratuitous benefits that 
they should really be paying for, their conduct would create 
inefficiencies in land use. 
B. Procedural Impediments to Benefits of Governmental 
Easements 
In order to unlock the efficiency, flexibility, and 
governance advantages of governmental easements, rules of 
standing, mandamus, and cy pres must be delineated in a manner 
that strikes the right balance between the need for judicial review 
and the need to defer to legislative and executive judgments. 
Where government officials clearly neglect their duties or act 
without process, citizens need access to courts. But there are 
significant costs to allowing the decisions of accountable, duly 
elected public officials to be replaced by judicial decisions 
emerging from expensive litigation whose very nature is to 
second-guess matters that may be best left to the representative 
and political process. Furthermore, the substantive 
requirements of cy pres in particular pose a unique threat to the 
good administration of governmental conservation easements.  
1. Standing 
a. Policy Framework 
By recognizing private citizens’ standing to sue and 
permitting independent enforcement of governmentally held 
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conservation easements, courts threaten the dual goals of 
flexibility and democratic control over local land use decisions. 
Conservation easements create public rights. Citizens should 
not be able to convert conservation easements into private 
benefits by enforcing them individually and thereby increasing 
the value of their own properties. While it is true that 
government acquisition of a conservation easement may 
increase the value of neighboring land, the benefit is fortuitous. 
Neighbors should not have a right to enforce an easement when 
government has decided to alter its scope and application.  
Government is the appropriate entity to balance 
competing public goals in easement modification decisions. 
Indeed, government actors are accountable for their decisions 
through the ballot box, and their decision-making processes are 
subject to procedural controls.131 Both of these features help 
provide public oversight of governmental actions. State 
regulation addressing the disposal of public real property also 
helps to ensure public protection.132 Courts should neither 
second-guess governmental decisions that were properly 
reached nor force government to defend private enforcement 
actions with the effect of depleting the public purse.  
The policy reasons that support generally placing limits 
on standing apply to private enforcement of governmental 
conservation restrictions, as well. For example, the requirement 
that a plaintiff suffer specific injury helps preserve separation of 
powers by preventing the judiciary from conducting a 
generalized examination of legislative decisions.133 Additionally, 
because the outcome may foreclose the rights of others through 
collateral estoppel or res judicata, standing doctrine also ensures 
that the plaintiff has adequate “skin in the game” to actively and 
effectively conduct the litigation.134 
  
 131 See, e.g., Thomas v. Beaumont Heritage Soc’y, 339 S.W.3d 893, 896-97 
(Tex. App. 2011) (granting historical association and individual standing under Texas 
Open Meetings Act to challenge school board decision to demolish a building); see also 
Soussa v. Denville Twp. Planning Bd., 568 A.2d 1225, 1226-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990) (indicating that a court could decide how the public interest should be 
represented in determination of enforceability of an open space covenant).  
 132 See infra Part III.C.  
 133 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also 
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 450, 496 (2008).  
 134 See Douglas v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Town of Watertown, 13 A.3d 
669, 673 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (“[J]udicial decisions which may affect the rights of others 
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . .”).  
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b. Case Decisions 
Several recent cases show that there are divergent 
approaches to the issue of standing in the enforcement of 
conservation easements. In Bjork v. Draper,135 the prior owners of 
the property, the Grays, granted a conservation easement to the 
Lake Forest Open Lands Association. The easement prohibited 
changes to the historical residence on the property, construction 
of additional buildings and improvements (except for a 1500-
square-foot addition), and alterations of the lawn and 
landscaped grounds. The deed specifically provided, however, 
that enforcement of the easement was at the discretion of the 
association. The Drapers subsequently purchased the burdened 
property and took various actions that raised questions about 
whether they had violated the restrictions.  
First, the Drapers sought to build a 1900-square-foot 
addition on the property, which exceeded the original easement 
deed’s square footage allowance. Nevertheless, the association 
consented to the larger addition in return for the Drapers’ 
agreement to replace the house’s aluminum siding with wooden 
siding, which would restore the house to its original condition. 
Second, the Drapers altered some landscaping on the lot by 
adding new shrubs. When the association learned of these 
prohibited changes, it entered into an agreement with the 
Drapers regarding landscaping. Finally, the association agreed 
to eliminate a portion of the easement to allow the Drapers to 
build a driveway turnaround in exchange for the Drapers’ 
designation of an equally sized easement on land that the 
original easement did not cover. The parties released 809 
square feet from easement coverage, or 3.2% of the total size of 
the easement property.  
The parties’ actions made sense from a practical, 
conservation, and policy perspective. Indeed, best practices 
require an ongoing dialogue between burdened property 
owners and easement holders in order to monitor easement 
enforcement, discuss potential problems, and make changes 
necessary to ensure the viability of both the easement and the 
fee owner’s use of the property.136 As a result, the parties’ first 
exchange led to a “win” for the association and the Drapers: the 
  
 135 Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct.), leave to appeal denied, 897 
N.E.2d 249 (2008), and aff’d, 936 N.E.2d 763 (2010), and subsequent leave to appeal 
denied, 943 N.E.2d 1099 (2011).  
 136 See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1062. 
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association exercised its discretion to secure restoration of the 
exterior of the house, which it believed was well worth the 
additional 400 square feet, and the Drapers received permission 
to build an addition to the scale they desired. And while few 
details emerged on the nature of the exchanges surrounding the 
landscaping agreement and the easement amendment, there is 
no evidence that the association exercised its discretion contrary 
to its mission. The association, like a governmental holder, 
should be able to make these decisions about easement 
enforcement and modification in order to promote flexibility 
and pursue overarching conservation values.  
So what was the problem? Unfortunately for the parties, 
Illinois legislation provided that owners within 500 feet of land 
subject to a conservation easement have standing to enforce 
it.137 The legislature’s impulse is understandable. In order to 
ensure that the benefits of conservation easements remain 
available to the public, it empowered a cadre of “private 
attorneys general” in the form of nearby property owners to 
enforce the easement. The effect of the legislation, however, can 
be perverse. It could allow neighbors to extract a private benefit 
(namely, the continuation of an easement arrangement that only 
serves the personal goals of neighbors), when the purpose of the 
easement, the overall conservation easement authorization, and 
the federal and state tax subsidies is to benefit the public. Bjork 
frames the harm arising from the Drapers’ landscaping 
changes as interference with the public’s ability to view the 
property and its open, scenic qualities from ground level on 
adjacent, publicly accessible land. But did the plaintiffs receive 
a special benefit from that view as nearby owners? Did their 
access to such a view enhance the value of their property? 
Although the case does not discuss this issue, one wonders if 
their attempt to enforce the restriction benefitted the views from 
plaintiffs’ property and enhanced their value. Unfortunately, the 
Illinois statute allows private plaintiffs to extract a private 
benefit through enforcement of public conservation easements, 
particularly where the easement holder has decided to modify 
the easement or refuses to enforce it.  
The initial appellate opinion held that the amendment 
permitting the land swap for the driveway turnaround was 
impermissible under the terms of the original easement. 
Moreover, on remand, the trial court held that the oversized 
  
 137 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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addition of 1900 square feet violated the easement.138 These 
decisions ignored the practical give and take—a necessary 
component of effective easement stewardship and enforcement—
as well as the expertise of the easement holder. Instead, at the 
request of unrelated, private individuals, the courts imposed their 
own views of a relatively minor issue onto the agreement between 
the easement holder and fee owner.139 One can only imagine the 
amount of money this nonprofit organization was forced to spend 
on legal fees in several trials and appeals in this matter, rather 
than on land conservation activities. Accordingly, the Illinois 
standing statute is ill-advised. Moreover, while Bjork involved 
an NPO easement, its lessons about third-party standing apply 
with equal force to governmental easements, as well.  
In contrast, the court in McEvoy v. Palumbo took a 
narrow view of third-party standing, leaving appropriate 
discretion to the town legislature.140 There, defendant Palumbo 
and plaintiff McEvoy owned neighboring parcels of land, but their 
separate parcels once belonged to a common owner, who had 
granted a conservation easement over the larger tract to the town 
of Woodbury. The conservation easement barred the “cutting of 
trees or plants . . . or disturbance of change in the natural habitat 
in any manner . . . .”141 Pursuant to a request by Palumbo, the 
town granted him the right to remove invasive species and mow a 
portion of his land subject to the easement. But when Palumbo 
later mowed the property, McEvoy brought suit against the town 
and Palumbo seeking to enjoin future cutting.  
The court rejected McEvoy’s request, finding that the 
selectmen had statutory authority to act for the town in such 
matters142 and that McEvoy lacked standing pursuant to a 
specific statutory provision.143 For support, the court cited the 
state’s conservation easement statute, which expressly grants 
the attorney general standing to enforce conservation 
easements, and held that the legislation did not provide 
  
 138 Bjork, 936 N.E.2d at 769.  
 139 Fortunately, the appellate court on the second appeal upheld the trial 
court’s application of the relative-hardship doctrine. As a result, while the turnaround 
and new trees had to be removed and relocated, the oversize addition did not have to be 
removed or reduced. Id. at 772-73. In any event, as a matter of policy, one might 
wonder whether this amount of litigation is appropriate in order to secure what turned 
out to be a comparatively small remedy.  
 140 McEvoy v. Palumbo, CV106002253S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2939 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011). 
 141 Id. at *3 (alteration in original). 
 142 Id. at *4. 
 143 Id. at *8. 
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standing to any other parties.144 Additionally, because the town 
and Palumbo’s actions did not cause specific injury to McEvoy’s 
legal interest, the court also held that McEvoy lacked standing 
under general standing principles.145  
The court apparently recognized the value of permitting 
a lawful easement holder to voluntarily modify agreements:  
[T]he plaintiff seeks to arrogate unto herself the right to determine 
when and how the town should exercise the discretion conferred 
upon it in the grant. The plaintiff has no legal right to compel the 
town to defer to her views as to when and how to exercise its 
discretion, and she has no standing to assert and litigate the claims 
in her complaint.146  
Accordingly, the refusal to recognize third-party standing in 
McEvoy demonstrates how courts can simultaneously satisfy the 
goals of flexibility and democratic control of local land issues.147  
Similarly, the court in Zagrans v. Elek correctly held 
that neighbors lacked standing to challenge an owner’s 
modification agreement that was subject to conservation 
easements.148 In that case, the owners of property adjacent to a 
park granted conservation easements to the county park 
district.149 Subsequently, the park district entered into a 
modification agreement with one of the ensuing owners to 
  
 144 Id. at *7-8. 
 145 Id. at *8-9. 
 146 Id. at *14. 
 147 Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 0228, 2012 WL 
468245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012), depublished by 46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2012), provides another example. Plaintiffs claimed standing to challenge decisions 
under governmentally-held conservation easements under three theories. First, 
plaintiffs alleged standing as third-party beneficiaries of the easement agreement. This 
was rejected by the court, which found that their status as neighbors and owners of 
properties also bound by conservation easements did not give them a right to bring an 
action. Rather, the court stated that the agreement made clear that the state had the 
right of enforcement. As discussed below, the court also (correctly) rejected standing 
based on charitable trust law. See infra Part III.B.3. While the court in Long Green 
Valley got most of the issues right, one aspect of its decision is troubling. The court felt 
compelled to apply to the case at hand a recent Maryland Supreme Court opinion that 
extended the rule that neighbors had standing in zoning cases to a challenge by a 
neighbor that a land disposition agreement by the city and a developer under an urban 
renewal plan was ultra vires or illegal. See 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 964 A.2d 662, 673 (Md. 2009). The Long Green Valley court thus held that 
the individual plaintiffs should be considered as “prima facie aggrieved” and thus 
entitled to standing, now placing the burden on defendants on remand to rebut that 
presumption by showing a lack of special damage. Id. at 506. This is an unfortunate 
extension of the standing rule, allowing public benefits to be converted to private rights 
and frustrating democratic governance principles.  
 148 Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 22, 2009). 
 149 Id. at *1. 
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release a portion of the owner’s property from the easement and 
place a previously unrestricted area under the easement.150 The 
property owner entered this exchange in order to build a home 
on his parcel; the neighboring owners, however, sought to 
enforce the easement as originally written.151 Nevertheless, the 
court held that the neighbors lacked standing, given that they 
neither qualified as an intended third-party beneficiary under 
the original easements nor possessed the requisite special 
interest for a taxpayer suit challenging a government 
contract.152 As the court explained,  
Appellants received a benefit from the easement conservation 
agreement because, up until the Eleks sought to modify the 
agreement, they were able to enjoy the aesthetics of the property and 
to maintain continuity amongst the various surrounding properties, 
which were also subject to conservation easements. As previously 
noted, however, the mere receipt of a benefit from a contract does not 
transform the recipient of that benefit into an intended beneficiary. 
The Fauvers and MetroParks entered into their easement agreement 
for the stated purpose of maintaining the property “in its present 
state . . . for the preservation of woodlands, wetlands and wildlife.” 
There is no evidence that the Fauvers and MetroParks intended to 
benefit Appellants by entering into their easement agreement. 
Consequently, Appellants’ argument that they were intended 
beneficiaries lacks merit.153 
It appeared that the court was sensitive to the neighbors’ attempt 
to free ride on the public easement. The court appropriately 
rejected this effort to extract a private advantage and deferred to 
the judgment of the public body that held the easement.  
c. Suggested Approach 
The rejection of third-party standing permits 
government to exercise discretion, both enabling public officials 
to achieve flexibility and allowing burdened owners to enjoy 
reasonable uses. Absent procedural defects or corruption, 
neighbors should be limited to challenging these actions only 
through the democratic process—that is, through public 
advocacy and the ballot box. The law of standing is complex.154 
  
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at *2-5. 
 153 Id. at *4. 
 154 See Bradford C. Mank, Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American 
Electrical Power Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 547-48 (2012) (describing 
federal “constitutional” standing, based on Article III cases and controversies 
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It emerges from different legal standards and complex factual 
situations,155 and as a result, courts balance competing policy 
and factual interests in reaching their decisions on standing.156 
In light of the policy concerns stressed above, courts should 
exercise their discretion within this framework to limit 
individual standing in the enforcement of governmental 
conservation easements.157  
2. Mandamus 
Mandamus is typically limited to compelling a 
government official or agency to perform a mandatory, 
ministerial, or statutorily imperative action.158 On the other 
hand, where the act involves discretion or judgment by the 
government actor, a court should refuse mandamus.159 
  
requirement and the ban on advisory opinions, and “prudential” standing rules, 
designed to husband judicial resources or for other policy reasons).  
 155 Federal courts have developed standing rules. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
162-63 (1997) (describing the “zone of interests” test); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). State rules may follow federal rules, see, 
e.g., KS Tacoma Holdings, LLC v. Shorelines Hearing Bd., 272 P.3d 876, 881 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2012) (specifically following federal “zone of interest” test), or may set their 
own standards, see, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 
P.3d 1005, 1012 n.3 (Cal. 2011) (specifically rejecting the federal “zone of interest” test); 
Bailey v. Preserve Rural Rds. of Madison Cnty., Inc., No. 2009-SC-000417-DG, 2011 
WL 6542996, at *2-4 (Ky. 2011) (requiring a “judicially cognizable interest” that is not 
remote or speculative; permitting association standing); Templeton v. Town of Boone, 
701 S.E.2d 709, 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (requiring particularized injury in fact, that 
will be redressed by a favorable decision). In addition to general standing rules, some 
substantive statutes may contain specific standing rules. See, e.g., In re Broad 
Mountain Dev. Co., 17 A.3d 434, 439-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (applying standing rule 
of Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code); KS Tacoma, 272 P.3d at 881 (applying 
standing provisions under state Shorelines Management Act).  
 156 See Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91-92 (Mont. 2011) 
(considering the “importance of the question to the public” along with traditional factors).  
 157 Standing in zoning cases is often granted more easily than this article 
suggests advisable for claims involving governmental conservation easements. Owners 
of nearby land which has been zoned for more intensive use are usually granted 
standing to challenge the ordinance. Mandelker, supra note 53, § 8.04; see, e.g., In re 
Broad Mountain Dev. Co., 17 A.3d at 440; Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 93-94. The right of 
neighbors is sometimes defined by statute. See, e.g., Douglas v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 13 A.3d 669, 671 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (owners within 100 feet, granted 
standing under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-8(a) (2007)). 
 158 See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991); 
City of Tarpon Springs v. Planes, 30 So. 3d 693, 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he 
Family requested the City to take an action under the agreement that the City had a 
right to refuse and did refuse. Such a case is not one for which this extraordinary writ 
is available . . . .”).  
 159 See, e.g., Giffort Pinchot Alliance v. Butruille, 742 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (D. 
Or. 1990) (“[M]andamus may not be used to direct acts within an agency’s discretion.”); 
In re Milek v. Town of Hempstead, 742 N.Y.S.2d 113, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).  
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Therefore, third parties are unlikely to succeed in obtaining 
mandamus orders to challenge governmental decisions 
regarding acquisitions, modifications, or terminations of 
conservation easements. Again, this outcome in the 
conservation easement context is appropriate in order to 
ensure that discretion remains in the hands of accountable, 
elected officials.  
In Moss v. Shinn, for example, the court refused to order 
that state officials either post a sign or deploy personnel to ban 
bicycles, which would ensure compliance with a “hikers only” 
policy on public trails.160 As the court explained, “A 
determination of the resources to be devoted to enforcement 
and the manner of enforcement clearly involves an exercise of 
the Department’s discretion.”161 The court warned that judicial 
intrusion into executive decisions would violate separation-of-
powers principles.162 
On the other hand, if a statute requires procedural or 
substantive conditions as a predicate to governmental action, 
mandamus may be appropriate to compel compliance with these 
requirements.163 Thus, in Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 
mandamus by a third party, Sierra Club, was appropriate when 
the city canceled a conservation easement without following 
statutory procedure and standards.164 Nevertheless, if statutory 
requirements are followed, no basis exists for a mandamus 
action challenging the government’s ultimate decision.165  
3. Charitable Trusts and Cy Pres  
A donor may transfer property to a government or 
nonprofit organization in one of two ways: as an absolute gift, 
or as a gift subject to a charitable trust or condition. If a court 
construes the gift of a conservation easement as an absolute 
gift, the government or nonprofit organization has significant 
discretion in administering the easement. But if the charitable-
trust doctrine applies, this opens the door to third parties to 
challenge the acquisition, modification, and termination of 
  
 160 Moss v. Shinn, 775 A.2d 243, 249 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).  
 161 Id. at 250.   
 162 Id.  
 163 See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 886-87 (N.M. 2011).  
 164 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 623 P.2d 180, 182 (Cal. 1981) (city 
failing to apply statutory cancellation provisions correctly by not making certain required 
findings and in making other findings that were not supported by substantial evidence).  
 165 See Glenn’s Dairy, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 675 A.2d 781, 783 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1996).  
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governmental and NPO conservation easements. Unfortunately, 
this result may decrease the flexibility of conservation 
easements, subject the government to litigation expenses, and 
perhaps even replace the government holder’s vision of the 
easement with the view of a third party.166  
Proponents of the charitable trust classification support 
it because they believe it will better protect the public’s 
interest, vindicate the charitable deduction, and better respect 
the perpetual nature of easements.167 On the other hand, other 
commentators have rejected the charitable trust doctrine’s 
application to conservation easements,168 claiming that the 
requisite intent to create a trust is absent and that the law’s 
limitations frustrate proper administration and alteration of 
conservation easements. Moreover, these commentators169 
believe that the Internal Revenue Code and accompanying 
regulations adequately ensure that any modifications or 
terminations will serve the public interest, since the nonprofit 
could otherwise lose its tax-exempt status and the original 
deduction could be invalidated.  
Finally, in the context of governmental conservation 
easements, there is a risk that charitable trust doctrine might 
be used by some aggrieved members of the public to achieve a 
result that they could not win through the democratic process or 
usual legal channels. A right to invoke the charitable trust 
doctrine should not exist to enable judges to second-guess elected 
officials’ decisions regarding the acquisition, modification, and 
termination of conservation easements. Indeed, objectors are not 
  
 166 The “conservation easements as charitable trusts” issue has been the 
subject of significant discussion. See, e.g., Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of 
Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REV. 757 (2005); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. 
Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25 (2008) [hereinafter Lindstrom, End of 
Perpetuity] (same); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense 
and the Charitable Trust Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397 (2009) [hereinafter Lindstrom, 
Conservation Easements] (rejecting the use of cy pres); Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. 
William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to The End of 
Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2009) (supporting use of charitable trust law); Matthew J. 
Richardson, Note, Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts in Kansas: Striking 
the Appropriate Balance Among the Grantor’s Intent, the Public’s Interest, and the Need 
for Flexibility, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 175 (2009). For an excellent, thoughtful analysis of 
this issue, see Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of 
Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual Conservation 
Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 167 See McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 166, at 5 (addressing perpetual 
easements); id. at 27-28, 55-56, 80-82 (discussing charitable deductions); id. at 70-71 
(discussing the public’s interest).  
 168 See Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity, supra note 166, at 83.  
 169 See, e.g., id. at 45-56. 
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without protection. They can remove officials through the 
democratic, electoral process. And they can invoke procedural 
protections, as well. For example, general constitutional and 
procedural requirements constrain officials’ actions and require 
transparency. Moreover, specific statutes may set additional 
procedural and public-participation requirements for these 
decisions—for example, statutes governing the sale of 
government-held land. If the objectors cannot prevail by these 
means, they should not be allowed to hijack the process. 
Democratic governments need freedom to perform the business 
of the people.  
a. Policy Considerations 
Interpreting a conservation easement to create a 
charitable trust generates several potential negative outcomes. 
First, a charitable trust finding would mean that the restrictive 
doctrine of cy pres applies to conservation easements. Under 
that doctrine, a trust can be modified only if unforeseen 
circumstances make the performance of the trust’s terms 
impossible or impracticable.170 Unfortunately, the requirements 
of unforeseen circumstances, impossibility, and impracticability 
severely limit the circumstances where a conservation easement 
could be modified to serve the public interest. Moreover, under 
the cy pres doctrine, only courts are empowered to approve a 
modification and make the final determination of what 
constitutes an appropriate alteration to the trust. As a result, 
the parties cannot agree to changes by themselves without 
ultimate court approval.171 Therefore, this doctrine’s application 
would severely limit the scope and circumstances of 
conservation easement modifications and terminations. As I 
have argued above, this is not a good result.  
Second, because attorneys general have standing to 
enforce the terms of charitable trusts, they have authority to 
contest a proposed modification in a cy pres action.172 This 
might prove problematic at times because it may expose a 
governmental entity to intragovernmental turf battles with the 
attorney general. Indeed, the units could have different 
conceptions of the public interest, as well as potentially 
competing political agendas. Finally, other third parties, such 
  
 170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). 
 171 Id. § 399 cmts. d, e.  
 172 Id. § 391 cmt. a.  
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as members of a small class of persons for whom the trust is 
created to benefit, may also have standing to participate in cy 
pres proceedings—at least pursuant to the law of some 
states173—and could stand in the way of beneficial modifications 
and terminations for many of the reasons set forth above.174  
b. Theoretical Gaps 
Doctrinal problems may also arise in attempting to 
apply charitable trust law to conservation easements. As an 
initial matter, conservation easements are creatures of 
property law, not charitable trust law. The fundamental goal of 
their enabling acts, such as the Uniform Conservation 
Easement Act (UCEA), is to ensure that conservation 
easements are treated like other easements. For example, 
section 2(a) of the UCEA states that “a conservation easement 
may be created . . . released, modified, terminated, or otherwise 
altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.”175 
This means that the doctrines of real property law—doctrines 
that allow termination of conservation easements upon consent 
of the parties176 or by judicial action under rules of easement 
and covenant law177—should apply.  
Not only should the rules of property law control, but 
the underlying policies and history of American land law 
should also inform conservation easement decisions. Property 
law has developed a series of principles to simultaneously 
guide the allocation of our limited land resources, balance 
competing private and public land rights, and accommodate the 
social, personal, economic, historical, and political importance 
of land ownership in the United States experience. Land law 
also takes account of the needs of both the present owners and 
of future generations.178 As creatures of property law, 
conservation easements invoke these policy considerations, and 
real property law supplies the architecture to find appropriate 
solutions. For example, the law of easements and covenants 
provides doctrines that allow for modifications and 
  
 173 Id. § 391 & cmt. c.  
 174 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 175 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981) (emphasis 
added). Others rely on comments, rather than the text of the statute, for support to 
view conservation easements as charitable trusts. See infra note 190.  
 176 KORNGOLD, supra note 101, §§ 6.08 (easements), 11.03 (covenants). 
 177 See id. at chs. 6, 11.  
 178 See generally Korngold, supra note 107. 
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terminations to address changed conditions, violations of public 
policy, and hardship.179 These doctrines help to prevent the 
frustration of current generations’ autonomy and aspirations, 
as well as the inefficiency of seemingly perpetual land ties.  
Moreover, conservation easement donations are not like 
typical charitable gifts since the donor retains an ownership 
right—namely, the fee in the land that is subject to the 
easement. This, in effect, creates two “owners” of the 
property—the fee owner, and the easement holder—and the 
rights of both must be recognized and protected. Fortunately, 
various property-law doctrines have been designed to confront 
these challenges: to manage various “owners” and their 
interests, resolve conflicts, and allow for necessary flexibility.180  
Cy pres proponents appear to overlook another 
important distinction: an owner can donate land or property 
without placing any restrictions on the gift.181 Although the 
NPO or governmental donee must use the donated property to 
serve its overall mission, there is no restriction that would 
require the donee to continue to hold the property or use it in a 
certain way. Indeed, the donee could sell the property and use 
the cash for mission purposes.182 Alternatively, an owner could 
donate a fee interest in land subject to a restriction. In that 
instance, the donee must follow the terms of the restriction 
precisely, in a manner analogous to a charitable trust.183 If 
those terms cannot be effectuated as new conditions emerge, 
then a cy pres proceeding would be necessary to find an 
alternate use. For example, if a donor gave a fee interest in 
land provided that the property is used for a boarding school 
for orphans, the restriction must be followed. If it becomes 
impractical to follow the restriction because, for example, there 
  
 179 See KORNGOLD, supra note 101, §§ 10.02 (covenants violating public 
policy), 11.07 (changed conditions), 11.08 (relative hardship). 
 180 The law of waste, for example, manages conflicts between current and 
future interest holders. See A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 
358-60 (5th ed. 2004). 
 181 A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 400(b) 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ALI, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS DRAFT NO. 2]. 
 182 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324 (“In 
the case of the absolute gift full ownership of the property given vests in the corporation, 
subject to the duties imposed upon it by its charter or articles of incorporation and by the 
terms of any agreements it makes by contract or in its acceptance of a qualified gift. The 
Attorney General has the power, as a representative of the state and by quo warranto or 
other proceedings, to compel the corporation to perform these duties, but he acts in a 
different capacity than as enforcer of charitable trusts.”). 
 183 See Blumenthal v. White, 683 A.2d 410, 413-14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) 
(finding gift of land to city on condition for use as a park creates charitable trust); ALI, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 181, § 400(b). 
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is an insufficient number of orphaned children, then a court 
could apply cy pres and order that the property be used for a 
similar purpose—for example, a school for children with only 
one living parent.  
Note, however, that the gifts in these examples convey a 
fee interest in the land, which the donor gives either 
unconditionally or subject to a restriction. On the other hand, 
with gifts of conservation easements, the gift is the 
conservation easement itself. In other words, the property right 
the donee acquires is the power to limit the use of land held by 
another. But there are no restrictions on the gift of the 
easement. For example, the easement does not state that the 
donor grants a conservation easement to the NPO subject to a 
restriction that the NPO offer free landscape painting classes. 
A gift of an easement therefore resembles a general gift to the 
organization, much like an unrestricted fee donation, which 
may be retained or sold as long as it serves the mission.184 
Indeed, courts invoke cy pres only where a gift is subject to a 
restriction, regardless of whether it is a fee or an easement. Cy 
pres is not appropriate, however, where a gift of a fee or an 
easement is unconditional.  
Finally, some conservation easements may be acquired 
by purchase rather than by gift.185 Even if one were to argue 
that gifts of conservation easements should be construed as 
creating charitable trusts (a view that this article rejects), 
much less support exists for applying the law of charitable 
trusts—which by its own terms only covers gifts—to easements 
that were acquired for consideration.186  
Others disagree with this assessment, however, and 
argue for the application of charitable trust law to conservation 
easements.187 Their positions are often based on articulated 
policy concerns, including the importance of preserving land, 
  
 184 Selling a fee or an easement for a suboptimal amount—for example, for 
less than the benefit the organization would have by simply retaining the property—
would not serve the mission. NPO directors would be held accountable for breach of 
fiduciary duty if they foolishly made a sale for too little money. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (defining duty of 
nonprofit directors). 
 185 See supra note 31 (discussing governmental easements acquired for 
consideration). 
 186 See Loomis v. City of Boston, 117 N.E.2d 539, 540-41 (Mass. 1954) 
(consideration plus lack of restrictive language mean no charitable trust was created); 
but see Cohen v. Lynn, 598 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass App. Ct. 1992) (allowing charitable 
trust despite payment of consideration).  
 187 See McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 434-35. 
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respect for the donor’s intent, and loss of the public’s tax 
expenditure.188 Moreover, modification outside of a cy pres 
proceeding may well place the 170(h) charitable deduction in 
dispute under current regulations and interpretations.189  
While I recognize that cy pres proponents raise some 
important policy concerns that cannot be ignored in crafting an 
appropriate legal solution, I respectfully disagree with their 
ultimate resolution of the issues. I have argued that the 
charitable trust model is not appropriate for analysis of all 
conservation easements and related modification issues. In 
order to address important land use policies and the needs of 
future generations, more flexible property-law modification and 
termination doctrines should apply unless there is clear and 
specific evidence of an intent by the donor, beyond the act of 
creating a conservation easement, to create a charitable trust 
and invoke that body of doctrine. At the same time, I hope that 
the various voices on the charitable trust question might join in 
a policy-based discussion of the issues and ultimately a greater 
understanding and accommodation of other perspectives.190 If 
  
 188 See supra note 166 & accompanying text; see also Nancy A. McLaughlin & Mark 
Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation: A Response 
to Professor Korngold’s Critique of Conservation Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561.  
 189 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (an easement is not denied deduction if 
subsequent unexpected changes in conditions make continued use of the property 
“impossible or impractical” for conservation, as long as funds from extinguishment of 
easement are invested in another conservation easement; the regulation does not 
permit swaps that are merely advantageous to conservation goals, but has the high 
threshold of “impossible or impractical” for conservation purposes); Belk v. Comm’r, 
No. 5437-10, 2013 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS, at *23-28 (U.S. T.C. Jan. 28, 2013) (clause in 
easement agreement allowing donor to unilaterally substitute new property for land 
being placed under easement prevented deduction; arguably, the facts are 
distinguishable from a situation where there is no such clause and the easement holder 
and donor subsequently mutually agree to a swap that increases the conservation goals 
of the nonprofit or governmental holder).  
 190 Textual support for treatment of conservation easements as charitable 
trusts is ambiguous. Language inserted into the Prefatory Note of the Uniform 
Conservation Easement Act in 2007 states that “the Act does not directly address the 
application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements.” UNIF. CONSERV. 
EASEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, at 3 (2007). Somewhat surprisingly in light of that 
comment, the Comment to section 3 of the Act was amended at the same time to read 
that “the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the 
enforcement of charitable trusts should apply to conservation easements.” Id. § 3 cmt. 
This does not clearly state, though, that conservation easements are considered to be 
charitable trusts. Indeed, the charitable trust law of a state might be applied to find a 
lack of intent to create a charitable trust with respect to any particular easement. This 
same Comment to section 3 quotes the comment to Uniform Trust Act § 414 in support, 
yet that only states that conservation easements “will frequently create a charitable 
trust”—but, by its own terms, not always. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting UNIF. TRUST 
ACT § 414 cmt. (2000)). Finally, these are statements in the comments of uniform acts, 
and courts typically hold that such comments are not controlling authority but may 
provide some guidance on legislative intent. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Crawley, 6 S.W.3d 
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so, a consensus may begin to develop on a viable, workable, and 
realistic modification and termination model that will serve 
present and future conservation goals and generations. 
c. Illustrative Cases 
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc. 
correctly refused to apply charitable trust law to a conservation 
easement, thus denying standing to an open-space-preservation 
association and two of its members and dismissing their 
challenge to a governmental easement holder’s decision.191 The 
Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF), 
an entity of the Maryland Department of Agriculture, purchased 
an agricultural preservation easement over Bellevale’s 199-acre 
farm for $796,500.192 The easement limited the land’s use to 
agricultural purposes and lasted “in perpetuity, or for so long as 
profitable farming is feasible” on the land.193 A Maryland statute, 
however, permitted owners of land subject to such easements to 
terminate the arrangement after twenty-five years, thus in 
effect limiting the perpetual feature.194 Subsequently, MALPF 
approved Bellevale’s request for permission to build a 7000- to 
10,000-square-foot building to house a creamery operation, 
processing facility, and farm store. In support of its decision, 
MALPF reasoned that under the terms of the easement 
agreement, this was a “farm related use.”195  
The Long Green Valley Association (LGVA), a 
community organization dedicated to open-space preservation 
in the Green Valley, and the Yoders, neighbors of Bellevale and 
members of LGVA, challenged the MALPF decision.196 After 
MALPF and the state secretary of agriculture refused to 
reverse the approval, plaintiffs brought suit.197 Plaintiffs sought 
a declaration that the creamery operation would violate the 
  
442, 446-47 (Tenn. 1999) (comments to U.C.C. helped to clarify legislative intent to 
include stock in closely-held corporation within definition of “security”). The strongest 
statement supporting cy pres comes in Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
§ 7.11, cmt. a, an influential but nonbinding source. Moreover, the hunt for textual 
clues and fragments suggesting the charitable trust view obscures the essential policy 
inquiry that should be taking place. 
 191 Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 0228, 2012 WL 468245 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 14, 2012), vacated, 46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
 192 46 A.3d at 478. 
 193 Id. at 479. 
 194 Id. at 497-98. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 479-80. 
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conservation easement and requested a writ of mandamus to 
order enforcement of the easement agreement.198 Plaintiffs 
argued that the conservation easement created a charitable 
trust that “any interested person,” including LGVA and the 
Yoders, could enforce.199  
The court extensively examined the conservation-
easement–charitable-trust issue. It discussed secondary sources 
and the limited case law before concluding that there was 
insufficient intent to create a charitable trust in the 
conservation easement before it. The court, however, limited its 
holding to the facts, stating that “we are not persuaded that the 
charitable trust doctrine must be applied to purchased, 
nonperpetual agricultural preservation easements, nor even that 
it should be.”200 Given the limited duration and consideration, the 
court found that the “donor” (that is, Bellevale) did not intend to 
create one.201 The court noted that while there are no specific 
words required for creation of a trust in the conservation-
easement context, it “is not something to be lightly inferred.”202 
Thus, parties are free to create a charitable trust relationship 
with respect to a conservation easement, but they must do so 
clearly. This view implicitly recognizes that if easements are 
treated as charitable trusts, they generate concerns of 
increased standing, loss of flexibility, and diminished control by 
democratically elected representatives.203 
C. Statutory Controls on Conservation Easement Flexibility 
A diverse range of state legislation governs the 
termination and modification of governmentally held 
conservation easements.204 In particular, however, there are 
three varieties of statutes that might contain restrictions on 
easement alteration: legislation authorizing conservation 
  
 198 Id. at 480. 
 199 Id. at 487. 
 200 Id. at 494.  
 201 Id. at 501.  
 202 Id. at 494-96 (quoting Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, supra note 166, 
at 403).  
 203 See generally Hicks ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of the Scenic Preserve Trust v. Dowd, 
157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007). This decision is of ambiguous precedential value in finding that 
conservation easements create charitable trusts because of its specific facts and because 
neither side challenged the trial court’s determination that a charitable trust was created.  
 204 For a comprehensive and helpful compilation, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, 
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally 
Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 2: Comparison to State Law, 46 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. J. 1, app. A (2011).  
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easements in general, statutes creating specific governmental 
easement programs, and legislation governing the sale of 
governmental assets and land in general. In order to achieve 
policy goals, these statutes should be crafted and interpreted to 
capture the flexibility and governance benefits of governmental 
conservation easements.  
1. General Conservation Easement Statutes 
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act and a number 
of state statutes provide that conservation easements may be 
released, terminated, or modified in the same manner as other 
easements.205 These statutes apply both to governmental and 
NPO easements, but they usually fail to provide specific 
substantive or procedural guidelines for the alteration of 
easements. Nevertheless, some statutes that generally authorize 
conservation easements do mandate special procedures to 
terminate governmental or NPO easements, such as approval by 
a governmental executive or legislative body.206 For example, 
New York requires that termination be permitted under the 
terms of the instrument or secured through the exercise of 
eminent domain, and it also prescribes a judicial proceeding to 
terminate easements held by NPOs or public bodies.207 
2. Specific Governmental Easement Programs 
In addition to statutes generally authorizing 
conservation easements, many states have enabling legislation 
creating particular programs for governmental conservation 
easements.208 Some of this legislation delineates specific 
requirements with respect to the release, termination, and 
modification of easements under these programs.209 Most of the 
statutes only address requirements for termination or release,210 
  
 205 See id. at 71 (citing Florida, Illinois, and Idaho, as well as the Uniform Act 
jurisdictions).  
 206 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-34 (West 2012); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 76-111 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-5 (West 2012) (also requiring 
prior public hearing).  
 207 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0301 (McKinney 2012).  
 208 McLaughlin, supra note 204, app. B at 90-92 (providing an excellent 
description of such statutes). This section relies on Professor McLaughlin’s compilation.  
 209 Id. at 90-124 (describing legislation relating to such programs). 
 210 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10270-10277 (West 2003) (agricultural 
easements); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (West 2011) (agricultural easement); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:24 
(2012) (water supply protection). 
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while a limited number cover modifications and alterations, as 
well.211 Many of the statutes with termination requirements 
involve agricultural easements.212 
These legislative acts may dictate procedural 
requirements, including a public hearing prior to termination;213 
approval by the executive or legislative branch,214 perhaps with 
a required onsite inspection of the property215 or judicial 
authorization;216 a judicial proceeding to review the executive or 
legislative termination decision;217 and voter approval.218 
Substantive requirements may include a finding of a public 
interest or necessity for termination;219 a finding of an absence 
of plausible alternatives;220 a determination that the required 
agricultural use is no longer profitable;221 a payment to the 
government holder equal to the value of the released rights;222 a 
  
 211 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (2005) (easements held by Natural 
Heritage Commission); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103F.515, .535 (2012) (agricultural easements).  
 212 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10260-10277 (agricultural easements); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, 
§§ 901-941 (1998) (agricultural easements); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (2012) 
(agricultural easements). 
 213 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 486-A:13 (water supply protection easement); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 13:8-49, -56 (West 1977) (scenic river easements).  
 214 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10200-10277 (agricultural easements); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.36101 to .36117 (2008) (farmland and open space); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 103F.515 (agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:31-a (water 
supply protection); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-4-4, -6 (2012) (easements pursuant to Green 
Acres Land Acquisition Act); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-59-10 to -140 (2002) (easements 
owned by South Carolina Land Bank).  
 215 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (agricultural easements). 
 216 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262.908(2)(c) (West 1994) (agricultural 
easements).  
 217 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (easements held by Natural Heritage 
Commission).  
 218 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); 32 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5010 (West 2012) (open space easements).  
 219 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 10273 (agricultural easements); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103F.535 
(agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:26 (agricultural easements); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-108 (West 1976) (open space easements). 
 220 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (easements held by Natural Heritage 
Commission). 
 221 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (2012) (agricultural easements); see 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-735 to -745 (2011) (agricultural easements); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN § 903 (West 2012) (agricultural easements).  
 222 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(i) (agricultural easement); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.36106 (West 2002) (farmland and open space); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 486-A:13(II)(e), (III)(b) (water supply protection easement and scenic 
river easements); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-59-10 to -140 (2002) (easements owned by 
South Carolina Land Bank).  
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return to the state of any grant funds used to acquire the 
easement;223 and a replacement easement.224 
A number of states set a low bar for termination or 
modification. For example, Illinois permits the release of some 
governmental easements simply upon mutual consent of the 
parties.225 Additionally, West Virginia permits the fee owner to 
essentially cancel an agricultural easement at will by repaying 
the amount initially received for the easement.226 
3. Disposition of Governmental Lands Generally 
Government termination or modification of a 
conservation easement could be viewed as a reconveyance of 
the easement rights in whole (termination) or in part 
(modification) to the fee owner. This raises the question of 
whether such “reconveyance” is consistent with the general rules 
regulating government transfers of real property. Those rules 
vary, however, depending on whether the land is held for public 
use or “private” use—that is, a ministerial or governmental 
capacity rather than for the public’s use more broadly.227  
Property held by the government for “private” purposes 
can be sold,228 subject to various procedural rules.229 These rules 
may require, for example, public notice of sales and a bidding 
process,230 as well as approval by specified government officers 
  
 223 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173A-10 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 486-A:15 (2012) (water supply protection easement); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 32-
4-12 (2012) (easements pursuant to Green Acres Land Acquisition Act).  
 224 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-59-80 (2012) (easements owned by South 
Carolina Land Bank).  
 225 See, e.g., 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-1 to 4-1 (West 2012) (conservation 
easements generally); id. 35/2-1 to 2-5 (easements pursuant to the topsoil protection 
program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 901.21 to .22 (West 2012) (agricultural easements 
extinguished according to terms of the creating instrument).  
 226 W.VA. CODE §§ 8A-12-1 to -21 (2004) (agricultural easements). 
 227 10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28:35 (3d ed. 2012). The 
public/private distinction is sometimes difficult to make. Id. § 28:41. 
 228 Id. § 28:35. 
 229 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-1-11-4 (2011) (describing sales procedures); State 
ex rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 881 (N.M. 2011) (New Mexico Constitution requires 
that the state land cannot be sold or leased except to the highest and best bidder at a 
public auction.); Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-10-00324-CV, 2012 
WL 1193722 at *2-4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012) (discussing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. §§ 263.007, 272.002 (West 2007) (requirements for sale of land by counties, 
including public notice and sealed bids)). Political subdivisions are subject to state 
control as they are agents of the state. See 10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 
supra note 227, §§ 28:35, :40.  
 230 See supra note 229.  
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and bodies.231 Other guidelines may examine the terms of the 
sale, requiring, for example, “adequate consideration.”232 A 
central purpose motivating these restrictions is to ensure that 
governments receive the highest price possible whenever they 
sell a public asset, thus providing maximum assistance to the 
public purse.233 Furthermore, these rules may help to prevent 
corruption in sales and protect government officials from 
pressure and coercion.234 
Property held by the government for public use cannot 
be sold except pursuant to specific statutory authority.235 These 
statutes typically impose requirements beyond mere procedural 
fairness, however. Parks, for example, are often singled out for 
special attention.236 Thus, in California, land that has been 
dedicated to park use cannot be conveyed by a park district 
unless approved at a special meeting by a majority of the 
district’s voters.237 In New York, park land cannot be sold 
without approval of the state legislature,238 given that 
“dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public 
trust for the benefit of the people of the State.”239 A prerequisite 
to such treatment, however, is that the land must be dedicated 
to public use, which may require certain formalities.240 
Together, these protections demonstrate the public’s special 
  
 231 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-1-11-3 (approval by executive and also by fiscal 
body for property appraised at over $50,000).  
 232 N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; see W.N.Y. Land Conservancy v. Town of 
Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).  
 233 See, e.g., King, 248 P.3d at 882-83; In re LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock, 
814 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (N.Y. CONST., art. VIII, § 1 bars 
conveyance of public property to private entities without adequate consideration.).  
 234 See, e.g., King, 248 P.3d at 883, 889; see also Murphy v. State, 181 P.2d 
336, 338 (Ariz. 1974) (describing land sale abuses when states admitted to Union 
disposed of large amount of public land).  
 235 10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 227, §§ 28:35, :36. 
 236 But see Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Citizens for Educ. & Env’t, Inc., 552 
S.E.2d 483, 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding city charter provision giving 
municipality the right to sell or otherwise dispose of park properties). 
 237 CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 5540 (West 1985) (including conservation easements 
dedicated to open space). Land held by park districts but not dedicated as such, 
however, are not subject to this provision. Ste. Marie v. Riverside Cnty. Reg’l Park & 
Open-Space Dist., 206 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2009); see also Citizens Planning Ass’n v. City of 
Santa Barbara, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (city ordinance restricting 
sale of parkland unless majority of voters approve).  
 238 Levine v. Vill. of Island Park Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 944 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012).  
 239 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 
(N.Y. 2001).  
 240 Courts thus must determine if the land was actually dedicated or acquired 
otherwise by the city. See, e.g., Vestavia Hills Bd. of Educ. v. Utz, 530 So. 2d 1378, 
1380-81 (Ala. 1988); Ste. Marie, 206 P.3d at 741.  
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interest in parks, the assumption that parks should remain as 
such, and perhaps the legislature’s concern that government 
officials may be willing to compromise those values for 
expediency or more sinister reasons.  
The courts have protected parklands with equal vigor. 
For example, one court rejected a simple utilitarian test, 
explaining that “no objects, however worthy, . . . which have no 
connection with park purposes, should be permitted to 
encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly 
conferred.”241 Other jurisdictions, however, may not be quite so 
deferential to parkland—at least under some circumstances. 
For example, courts have drawn a distinction between land 
donated to a city in fee simple absolute, on one hand, and land 
donated conditionally or formally dedicated to park purposes, 
on the other, permitting cities to sell the former but not the 
latter.242 Presumably, these jurisdictions are willing to let 
elected officials settle the issue of park permanence, allowing 
the political process and procedural rules to protect citizens. 
Courts thus must distinguish absolute gifts containing only 
precatory words from gifts manifesting a grantor’s intent to 
impress a binding park restriction.243  
As a preliminary matter, a court must determine 
whether governmental conservation easements are held for 
“public use.” When the easement does not grant public access, 
one could argue that there is no actual use of the land by the 
public and that the land is therefore different from parkland. 
On the other hand, the public does derive a benefit from the 
scenic values, habitat protection, and open-space benefits the 
easement secures. Indeed, the law recognizes nonpossessory 
interests, such as restrictive covenants, as valued property 
rights. Accordingly, a court would likely find that governmental 
conservation easements are for public use.  
  
 241 Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920). 
 242 See, e.g., O’Rorke v. City of Homewood, 237 So. 2d 487, 489 (Ala. 1970); Carlson 
v. City of Fremont, 142 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Neb. 1966); see Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Citizens for Educ. & Env’t, Inc., 552 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding city charter 
provision giving municipality the right to sell or otherwise dispose of park properties).  
 243 Compare Loomis v. City of Boston, 117 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Mass. 1954) (park 
land could be sold), with Cohen v. City of Lynn, 598 N.E.2d 682, 684-85 (Mass. Ct. App. 
1992) (binding words of condition).  
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CONCLUSION 
Governmental conservation easements are a valuable 
tool, along with easements held by nonprofit organizations and 
public land use regulation, to help protect our limited land 
resources. In certain situations, governmental conservation 
easements offer unique benefits by increasing efficiency, avoiding 
coercive governmental action, promoting flexibility of 
conservation arrangements, and valuing democratic participation 
in vital land use decisions. Accordingly, legislatures and courts 
should ensure that the law regulating governmental easements 
is designed and applied in ways that maximize their benefits for 
today’s citizens and future generations.  
